Abstract. Multimedia security schemes often combine cryptographic schemes with information hiding techniques such as steganography or watermarking. Example applications are dispute resolving, proof of ownership, (asymmetric/anonymous) fingerprinting and zero-knowledge watermark detection. The need for formal security definitions of watermarking schemes is manifold, whereby the core need is to provide suitable abstractions to construct, analyse and prove the security of applications on top of watermarking schemes. Although there exist formal models and definitions for information-theoretic and computational security of cryptographic and steganographic schemes, they cannot simply be adapted to watermarking schemes due to the fundamental differences among these approaches. Moreover, the existing formal definitions for watermark security still suffer from conceptual deficiencies.In this paper we make the first essential steps towards an appropriate formal definition of watermark robustness, the core security property of watermarking schemes: We point out and discuss the shortcomings of the existing proposals and present a formal framework and corresponding definitions that cover those subtle aspects not considered in the existing literature. Our definitions provide suitable abstractions that are compatible to cryptographic definitions allowing security proofs of composed schemes.
MotivationMultimedia applications deploy various cryptographic and watermarking techniques to maintain security. Typical application scenarios are dispute resolving, proof of authorship and asymmetric and anonymous fingerprinting.In this context, the security analysis and security proofs for the resulting composed schemes require a suitable formal framework and reasonable security definitions. Modern cryptography already uses established formal models and definitions for information-theoretic and computational security. Inspired by cryptographic methodology similar approaches have been proposed for