Fungus Diseases of Tropical Crops, by P. Holliday. xv + 607 pp. Mineola, NY, USA: Dover Publications (1995). $22.95 (paperback). ISBN 0 486 68647 7.

Russell, P. E.

doi:10.1017/s0021859600075043

Cited by 8 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The distinction between episodic and semantic memorial experience can thus be seen as one of differences in manner of acquaintance (e.g., Russell, 1912/1999). We are acquainted with semantic pastness indirectly via inference, whereas our acquaintance with episodic pastness is directly given as the feeling that we are re-living our past.…”

Section: Is Autonoetic Awareness Intrinsic To Episodic Recollection?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Making the case that episodic recollection is attributable to operations occurring at retrieval rather than to content stored in a dedicated subsystem of long-term memory

Klein¹

2013

Front. Behav. Neurosci.

139

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Episodic memory often is conceptualized as a uniquely human system of long-term memory that makes available knowledge accompanied by the temporal and spatial context in which that knowledge was acquired. Retrieval from episodic memory entails a form of first–person subjectivity called autonoetic consciousness that provides a sense that a recollection was something that took place in the experiencer's personal past. In this paper I expand on this definition of episodic memory. Specifically, I suggest that (1) the core features assumed unique to episodic memory are shared by semantic memory, (2) episodic memory cannot be fully understood unless one appreciates that episodic recollection requires the coordinated function of a number of distinct, yet interacting, “enabling” systems. Although these systems—ownership, self, subjective temporality, and agency—are not traditionally viewed as memorial in nature, each is necessary for episodic recollection and jointly they may be sufficient, and (3) the type of subjective awareness provided by episodic recollection (autonoetic) is relational rather than intrinsic—i.e., it can be lost in certain patient populations, thus rendering episodic memory content indistinguishable from the content of semantic long-term memory.

show abstract

Section: Is Autonoetic Awareness Intrinsic To Episodic Recollection?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Making the case that episodic recollection is attributable to operations occurring at retrieval rather than to content stored in a dedicated subsystem of long-term memory

Klein¹

2013

Front. Behav. Neurosci.

139

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…However, this should not be seen as a call to reaffirm the Platonic distaste of understanding by reliance on the “grossness of bodily senses.” Rather, it is an appeal to broaden our criteria for understanding beyond the reductionist materialism that characterizes much of Western thinking, and to embrace the possibility that there are aspects of reality that may not (easily) submit to such highly circumscribed treatment (e.g., Meixner, 2008; Papa-Grimaldi, 2010; Nagel, 2012; Klein, 2014a). Some phenomena, if they are to be saved, can be saved only if we allow that knowledge by acquaintance (e.g., Russell, 1912/1999) sometimes may be the metaphysically propitious stance. Personal diachronicity very well may be a case in point.…”

Section: Some Final Thoughtsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, as often is true of common-sense notions, on careful reflection they are found to be conceptually underspecified and referentially vague (e.g., Russell, 1912/1999). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Sameness and the self: philosophical and psychological considerations

Klein

2014

Front. Psychol.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper I examine the concept of cross-temporal personal identity (diachronicity). This particular form of identity has vexed theorists for centuries—e.g., how can a person maintain a belief in the sameness of self over time in the face of continual psychological and physical change? I first discuss various forms of the sameness relation and the criteria that justify their application. I then examine philosophical and psychological treatments of personal diachronicity (for example, Locke's psychological connectedness theory; the role of episodic memory) and find each lacking on logical grounds, empirical grounds or both. I conclude that to achieve a successful resolution of the issue of the self as a temporal continuant we need to draw a sharp distinction between the feeling of the sameness of one's self and the evidence marshaled in support of that feeling.

show abstract

“…In particular, I want to suggest that the transparency assumption is the best explanation of dream reporting. This is an initially attractive move, because inference to the best explanation (IBE) has been suggested as a powerful response to Cartesian dream skepticism (Russell, 1912/1999, p. 9; Vogel, 1990; Briesen, 2008). I claim that it provides an equally powerful response to the skeptic about dream reporting.…”

Section: Why To Trust Dream Reportsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reporting dream experience: Why (not) to be skeptical about dream reports

Windt

2013

Front. Hum. Neurosci.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Are dreams subjective experiences during sleep? Is it like something to dream, or is it only like something to remember dreams after awakening? Specifically, can dream reports be trusted to reveal what it is like to dream, and should they count as evidence for saying that dreams are conscious experiences at all? The goal of this article is to investigate the relationship between dreaming, dream reporting and subjective experience during sleep. I discuss different variants of philosophical skepticism about dream reporting and argue that they all fail. Consequently, skeptical doubts about the trustworthiness of dream reports are misguided, and for systematic reasons. I suggest an alternative, anti-skeptical account of the trustworthiness of dream reports. On this view, dream reports, when gathered under ideal reporting conditions and according to the principle of temporal proximity, are trustworthy (or transparent) with respect to conscious experience during sleep. The transparency assumption has the status of a methodologically necessary default assumption and is theoretically justified because it provides the best explanation of dream reporting. At the same time, it inherits important insights from the discussed variants of skepticism about dream reporting, suggesting that the careful consideration of these skeptical arguments ultimately leads to a positive account of why and under which conditions dream reports can and should be trusted. In this way, moderate distrust can be fruitfully combined with anti-skepticism about dream reporting. Several perspectives for future dream research and for the comparative study of dreaming and waking experience are suggested.

show abstract

Fungus Diseases of Tropical Crops, by P. Holliday. xv + 607 pp. Mineola, NY, USA: Dover Publications (1995). $22.95 (paperback). ISBN 0 486 68647 7.

Cited by 8 publications

References 0 publications

Making the case that episodic recollection is attributable to operations occurring at retrieval rather than to content stored in a dedicated subsystem of long-term memory

Making the case that episodic recollection is attributable to operations occurring at retrieval rather than to content stored in a dedicated subsystem of long-term memory

Sameness and the self: philosophical and psychological considerations

Reporting dream experience: Why (not) to be skeptical about dream reports

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About