Game analysis on prefabricated building evolution based on dynamic revenue risks in China

Li, Xiaojuan; Wang, Chen; Alashwal, Ali Mohammed; Bora, Shilpi

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.121730

Cited by 73 publications

(46 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Chen used evolutionary game theory to provide insights for promoting green building policy in China and provided suggestions for building stakeholders to maintain market competitiveness [ 37 ]. Li uses evolutionary game theory to provide method suggestions for further promoting prefabricated buildings in China [ 38 ]. Evolutionary game theory can be used to analyze the influence of each parameter in the game model on players’ decision-making behaviour and reveal the evolutionary path of their strategic choice.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Process of Promoting Construction Safety Education to Avoid Construction Safety Accidents in China

Liu

Wang

Song

2021

IJERPH

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Construction safety is related to the life and health of construction workers and has always been a hot issue of concern for government and construction units. The government can use “construction safety education” to reduce the probability of safety accidents in the construction process and avoid the loss of life and property of construction workers. To encourage construction units to provide safety education for construction workers before construction starts and promote construction workers to actively participate in safety education. In this paper, a tripartite evolutionary game model of government–construction units–construction workers is established, and the factors affecting each party’s behavior strategy are comprehensively analyzed. Firstly, evolutionary game theory is used to investigate the influence of different behavior strategies among government, construction units, and construction workers on the behavior strategies of the other two parties. Secondly, according to the events in different situations, the influence of critical factors on the evolution process of the model is analyzed. On this basis, combined with the construction experience and construction data of actual construction projects, the established model and preliminary conclusions are verified. Finally, a sensitivity analysis of all parameters is carried out. The results show that: (1) The government’s enhancement of reward and punishment is conducive to promoting the choice of "providing safety education" for construction orders and the choice of “actively participating in safety education” for construction workers, but the excessive reward will lead to the government’s unwillingness of participation; (2) The reasonable reward and punishment mechanism set by the government must meet the condition that the sum of rewards and punishments for all parties is more significant than their speculative gains, to ensure the construction safety under the evolutionary stability; (3) Increasing welfare subsidies for construction workers who choose to participate in safety education actively is an effective way to avoid unwilling participation of construction workers.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Process of Promoting Construction Safety Education to Avoid Construction Safety Accidents in China

Liu

Wang

Song

2021

IJERPH

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“…The results showed that there were many different evolutionary stability strategies in the model; moreover, the study proposed adopting a safety information system to improve the safety performance in construction projects. Li et al [17] used game theory and system dynamics to identify the revenue risks related to the development of prefabricated buildings, and established an evolutionary game model for the behaviors of project developers and owners based on dynamic revenue risks. Through case analysis, it was concluded that increasing the incremental revenue of developers was the key factor for promoting the development of projects, and that this model could effectively analyze the actual situations of prefabricated buildings.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Subject Risk Management Behavior in Construction Stage of Engineering Project Based on Strong Reciprocity and Prospect Theory

2021

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In this study, to reduce the occurrence of risks and risk accidents in the construction stages of engineering projects and strengthen the risk management abilities of the subjects of such projects, prospect theory is introduced into an evolutionary game to construct a risk management behavior game model between owners and contractors in the construction stage. In addition, a government penalty parameter is introduced based on strong reciprocity theory. The intrinsic laws and optimal evolutionary stability strategy in the behavior evolution game between the two parties are analyzed. The influences of different parameter changes on the evolution results are simulated. The study shows that the game model has five local equilibrium points, and that positive risk management for both parties is a stable evolutionary strategy. The factors influencing the evolution results include the cost of positive risk management, risk perception loss and its share ratio, risk perception loss discount coefficient, and negative penalty coefficient. The differences in risk perceptions and effect of prospect theory hinder the behaviors of both parties from evolving towards the optimal strategy. By means of a negative penalty, a strong reciprocal government strategy can effectively coordinate the risk behavior strategies of both parties. Based on the analysis, suggestions are proposed for strengthening the effective management of risks in the construction stages of engineering projects.INDEX TERMS Engineering project, risk management behavior, strong reciprocity theory, prospect theory, evolutionary game.

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“…[5] analyzed the government subsidies' perspective on what policies the local government should implement to enable construction units to cooperate better with the construction of prefabricated buildings. Li (2020) [6] pointed out that the stability of the prefabricated building development system is related to cost increase, income, and risk, which will affect the behavior of the government and developers. Zhou (2019) [7,8], starting from the external benefits of prefabricated buildings, using bargaining games to analyze the external benefit distribution between the government, developers, and consumers, established a quantitative analysis model and determined quantitative indicators of environmental benefits.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Behavior Incentives of Prefabricated Building Component Manufacturers

Yao

Liu

2021

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Based on the positive externalities of prefabricated buildings, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between the government and material component vendors and analyzes the changes in the behavior of the government and component vendors in different stages of the advancement of prefabricated buildings. Based on data modeling and equation prediction analysis, it can be found that the expansion of the incremental cost of construction at the initial stage inhibits the enthusiasm of the government. Thus, the government’s incentive behavior effectively affects the behavior of component vendors, and fiscal taxation and punishment policies will promote component vendors to provide prefabricated components. In the development stage, the government’s fiscal policy influence that weakens and affects component vendors’ behavior mainly comes from the incremental costs and benefits of components. Additionally, the difference between the builder’s incremental cost and the sales revenue narrowed. At this time, the behavior prediction of both parties tends to be steady. In the mature stage, prefabricated buildings will mainly rely on market forces, and the government can gradually withdraw from the market. The cost variable tends to be lower, and it can be predicted that component vendors tend to supply components, while the government tends to restrict policies.

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Game analysis on prefabricated building evolution based on dynamic revenue risks in China

Cited by 73 publications

References 13 publications

Evolutionary Process of Promoting Construction Safety Education to Avoid Construction Safety Accidents in China

Evolutionary Process of Promoting Construction Safety Education to Avoid Construction Safety Accidents in China

Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Subject Risk Management Behavior in Construction Stage of Engineering Project Based on Strong Reciprocity and Prospect Theory

Research on Behavior Incentives of Prefabricated Building Component Manufacturers

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