Game Analysis on the Evolution of Decision-Making of Vaccine Manufacturing Enterprises under the Government Regulation Model

Abstract

The harm caused by defective vaccines to human health and social stability is immeasurable. Aiming at the government’s supervision of the vaccine market, an evolutionary game model is constructed to analyze the quality of supervision and the key factors in the dynamic interaction between government departments and vaccine manufacturers under different supervision modes in the vaccine manufacturing process. The results show that: (1) Severe punishment by government regulatory authorities, and increased costs of rectification after investigation and handling of involuntary behaviors of vaccine enterprises can effectively prevent involuntary behaviors of vaccine enterprises. (2) In the early stage of the game, the success rate of the government’s efficient supervision will make the vaccine enterprises continuously self-disciplined; when the vaccine market is relatively stable, the government’s supervision departments tend to be more conducive to passive supervision. (3) The success rate of government regulatory departments and the probability of a third-party reporting to play a great role in promoting the self-discipline of enterprises. (4) The power of government and regulation are conducive to promoting the active supervision of the government regulatory authorities but corruption of government and awareness of people are different. Once the phenomenon of vaccine enterprises’ non-discipline increases, the government regulation must change from passive regulation to active regulation. Therefore, the government should implement different measures according to the characteristics of each period in the manufacturing process to effectively prevent problematic vaccines. The conclusions and policy recommendations are significant for addressing the issue of insufficient self-discipline of vaccine manufacturers.

A Survey of Cyber-Physical Systems From a Game-Theoretic Perspective

“…This study models interactive decisions that determine the optimal solutions for a single manufacturer, multiple distributors, and multiple subcontractors by confirming that all stakeholders' profits are maximized. Among other manufacturing industries, the use of game theory can be found in cellular manufacturing systems (using a cooperative game [445]), cloud manufacturing (using a minority game [446]), vaccine manufacturing (using an evolutionary game [447]), warehousing industry (using a cooperative game [448]), and prefabricated building project (using an extensive form game [292]).…”

China’s Jinshan Yinshan sustainability evolutionary game equilibrium research under government and enterprises resource constraint dilemma

“…Moreover, evolutionary game theory is based on applying the traditional mathematical model of game theory to study animal conflicts’ dynamics, just like human conflicts (Du et al 2020 ; Nowak and Sigmund 2004 ). After the emergence of the evolutionary game theory concept, it has been widely explored to examine the environment regulations (Gao and Fan 2019 ; Sun and Zhang 2019 ), green innovation (Cui et al 2020 ; Zhang et al 2020a , b , c , d ), and policy-making (Babu and Mohan 2020 ; Fan and Hui 2020 ). Some scholars have explored the environmental regulations and the firm’s environmental sustainability behavior using the game theory approach and provided valuable insights (Li et al 2018a , b ; Uşar et al 2019 ).…”

“…As a case study, Zhang et al ( 2020a , b , c , d ) analyzed environmental regulations and their effect on urban green innovation using Xian (China). Initially, the Slacks-based measure of directional distance functions (SBM-DDF) model was used to assess Xi’an’s green-innovation efficiency from 2003 to 2016, followed by regression testing green innovation impact under three environmental regulations, including supervision, market-based, and voluntary regulations.…”

“…Thus, enterprises must respond to changes in their external environments (Daddi et al 2016 ; Damert and Baumgartner 2018 ; Eti-Tofinga et al 2018 ; Wang et al 2018 ). The high level of resource consumption and environmental pollution, especially in emerging economies, outsurfaced with industrial enterprises (de Jesus Pacheco et al 2018 ; Rafindadi et al 2018 ; Zhang et al 2020a , b , c , d ). If corporations could fairly quickly satisfy external demands by using comprehensive production models (Jennings and Zandbergen 1995 ; Lin et al 2019a , b ).…”

“…Thus, to carefully analyze and predict the game outcomes between the enterprises and government, it is suggested to adopt the most suitable methodology. The “replication dynamics” is referred as the mechanism that will simulate and depict the learning and dynamic adjustment process and based on this “evolutionary stability strategy” is considered desirable for reviewing the stability and dynamic evolutionary phases (Zhang et al 2020a , b , c , d ). This study constructs the replicated dynamic equations, which is followed by the analysis of evolutionary stabilization strategies.…”