2013
DOI: 10.1109/surv.2012.111412.00167
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Game Theory Applications in CSMA Methods

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
35
0

Year Published

2015
2015
2021
2021

Publication Types

Select...
6
1
1

Relationship

0
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 47 publications
(35 citation statements)
references
References 83 publications
0
35
0
Order By: Relevance
“…The expected payoff provided by NE and CE is the same, following the expression in (11), as shown in Reference [8].…”
Section: Correlated Equilibrium Conceptmentioning
confidence: 93%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The expected payoff provided by NE and CE is the same, following the expression in (11), as shown in Reference [8].…”
Section: Correlated Equilibrium Conceptmentioning
confidence: 93%
“…An option to study these attacks consists in using game theory tools, which find many applications in the wireless networks field [9] and is a popular choice when it comes to multiple access attacks. In Reference [10], there is a survey on game theory approaches to multiple access situations in wireless networks and Reference [11] contains another survey more concretely focused on CSMA. Other works studying wireless networks under backoff attacks are References [12][13][14].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We have found a significant number of contributions applying GT in wireless networks. A lot of this work reviews scenarios of single-hop access [101], namely: network-layered perspective [102]; multiple access [103]; random carrier sense multiple access [104]; radio resource management and admission control [105]; repeated games [23]; reputation-based network selection [47]; evolutionary games [35]; uplink resource allocation [106]; and network selection [107]. In addition, we have found related work with multi-hop wireless access such as ad hoc networks [108] and games to stimulate cooperation [52].…”
Section: Review Of Theoretical Model Gamesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Therefore, the max-log-likelihood problem below is a convex optimization problem with r as the variables to be solved and θ as the parameters: max r F ( r; θ ) (Maximize log-likelihood). (15) It is then shown in [11] that the max-log-likelihood problem in (15) is the dual problem of the max-entropy problem in (16), where − s∈S p s log e p s is the entropy of the distribution vector − → p , whose element p s is the state probability for the state s, ∀ s ∈ S. The max-entropy problem is also a convex optimization problem, with − → p as the variables and θ as the parameters.…”
Section: B Transmission Aggressivenessmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Since all the constraints in (16) are linear equalities and inequalities, we only need to verify that there exists a feasible − → p in the relative interior [24, pp. 23] of the domain D of the objective…”
Section: B Transmission Aggressivenessmentioning
confidence: 99%