Gender and Monetary Policymaking: Trends and Drivers

Masciandaro, Donato; Profeta, Paola; Romelli, Davide

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2683917

Cited by 12 publications

(10 citation statements)

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“…Regardless of factors influencing monetary policy, such as financial liberalization, there are likely to be gender-differentiated effects on employment, consumption, and children's wellbeing with resulting feedback effects on growth. Only a handful of papers have explored the impact of contractionary monetary policy on gendered outcomes (Braunstein and Heintz 2006;Tachtamanova and Sierminska 2009;Seguino and Heintz 2012) while two papers explore the relationship between gender representation on monetary policy committees and the conduct of monetary policy (Diouf and Pépin 2016;Masciandaro, Profeta, and Romelli 2016). Braunstein and Heintz (2006) were pioneers in this research.…”

Section: Monetary Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In terms of the conduct of monetary policy, Diouf and Pépin (2016) and Masciandaro, Profeta, and Romelli (2016) find evidence that gender diversity in central bank boards and chairs affects the conduct of monetary policy and hence macroeconomic outcomes. Greater relative female representation on central bank boards is inversely associated with inflation rates and money growth.…”

Section: Monetary Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Engendering Macroeconomic Theory and Policy

Seguino

2019

Feminist Economics

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This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. Nothing herein shall constitute or be considered to be a limitation upon or waiver of the privileges and immunities of The World Bank, all of which are specifically reserved.

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Section: Monetary Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Monetary Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

Engendering Macroeconomic Theory and Policy

Seguino

2019

Feminist Economics

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“…Among these 26 chairwomen, 24 were appointed after 2005 and 22 after 2008, indicating still very small and insufficient progress since the crisis. There are so far very few studies on the long-neglected question of gender diversity in central bank governance and of the factors relating to women's (under-)representation, their policy implications and macroeconomic outcomes (Diouf and Pépin 2017;Farvaque et al 2011;Masciandaro et al 2015). Furthermore, these quantitative studies, based on sample populations of chairwomen too small to produce generalisable findings, don't allow us to perceive the complex mechanisms of exclusion and their consequences regarding gender inequality.…”

Section: A Descriptive Analysis Of Central Bankers' Trajectoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Central Bankers as a Sociological Object: Stakes, Problems and Possible Solutions

Lebaron

Dogan

2020

Researching Elites and Power

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Central bankers can be defined as agents in charge of the decisions that are studied, developed and implemented within the central banks. These financial institutions have been both products and agents of nation-building and state formation (Cohen 1998; Feiertag and Margairaz 2016; Helleiner 1998), as well as that of the international diffusion of norms and structures (Krampf 2013; Marcussen 2005; Polillo and Guillén 2005). They are inserted and act in national and historical contexts, but they also share common functions (control of credit and money supply, banking and payment system supervision, reserve management, monetisation of budget deficit, collection and publication of data, etc.), objectives (price stability, macroeconomic and financial consistency), instruments (interest rates, open market operations, cash reserve ratio or other requirements and tools) and norms. Equipped with monopoly privileges such as issuing notes and acting as the final authority on monetary policy decisions, these institutions coordinate, in varying degrees, with governments. They also cooperate with each other as well as with regional, international and supranational decision-makers, some of which-such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)-monitor and engage in policy coordination (Borio et al. 2008; Eichengreen et al. 2018; Toniolo 2005). In fact, in addition to being national policy-makers, central bankers have acquired a major role in the contemporary world economy and a central position in global governance (Baker 2006; Hall 2008). In comparison with other sectors of public policy, monetary decisions are, in general, clearly identified and highly formalised. Furthermore, they are characterised by a very high degree of centralisation of decision power in the hands of a few

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“…The main idea is that the diversity in the MPC, in terms of gender, but also of age, of professional, sectoral and academic backgrounds, can influence the monetary policy decisions (Farvaque et al, 2014, Masciandaro et al, 2016. In particular, it points out that women"s presence in the MPC could have an important effect on policy outcomes (Chappell et al, 2005;Farvaque et al, 2011;Bennani et al, 2015;Masciandaro et al, 2016). The findings obtained by the empirical literature highlighted a higher share of women in the MPC is associated positively with price stability.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In particular, as central bankers, they need to make or to acquire a reputation and credibility. Hence they are invited to have hawkish rather than dovish attitude (Wilson, 2014;Hix et al, 2010;Farvaque et al, 2011Farvaque et al, , 2014Eijffinger et al, 2015;Masciandaro et al, 2016). Thus, higher women"s presence in MPC is associated with better performance in terms of price stability.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gender and central banking

Diouf

Pépin

2017

Economic Modelling

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Female Central Bank chairs represent but a tiny minority. To understand why, this article analyzes socioeconomic and socio-political characteristics of the countries where women have chaired Central Banks. Then, it suggests that gender differences in preferences as regards monetary policy goals may have some influence. An innovative econometric methodology, which does not require estimating all the structural and preference parameters of a monetary model, but only how men and women"s parameters differ, is developed to test this hypothesis. The results show that female Central Bank chairs focus more than their male counterparts on achieving the price stability goal. This means, then, that women are more resistant than men to political pressures. Finally, it concludes that gender differences in degree of conservatism may be an explanatory factor in female underrepresentation in the Central Bank chairs.

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Gender and Monetary Policymaking: Trends and Drivers

Cited by 12 publications

References 32 publications

Engendering Macroeconomic Theory and Policy

Engendering Macroeconomic Theory and Policy

Central Bankers as a Sociological Object: Stakes, Problems and Possible Solutions

Gender and central banking

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