Gender as a historical kind: a tale of two genders?

Abstract

Is there anything that members of each binary category of gender have in common? Even many non-essentialists find the lack of unity within a gender worrying as it undermines the basis for a common political agenda for women. One promising proposal for achieving unity is by means of a shared historical lineage of cultural reproduction with past binary models of gender (e.g. Bach in Ethics 122:231–272, 2012). I demonstrate how such an account is likely to take on board different binary and also non-binary systems of gender. This implies that all individuals construed as members of the category, “women” are in fact not members of the same historical kind after all! I then consider different possible means of modifying the account but conclude negatively: the problem runs deeper than has been appreciated thus far.

Essential Properties Are Super-Explanatory: Taming Metaphysical Modality

“…But consciously designed items like these are not the only Historical Kinds. Various types of social category can also be seen in this light: the many beliefs and behaviors characteristic of Christians, say, or molecular biologists, or Japanese women, are arguably shared because they are copied from prior models (see Godman 2015, 2018; Ásta 2018). In addition, as we now argue, biological taxa are also Historical Kinds.…”

Concept‐metacognition

“…Many think that we ought to stop using racial concepts irrespective of whether, despite the common misconceptions encoded in the concepts, for instance about essence, they do in fact succeed in referring (Mallon, 2006). A contemporary argument about gender concerns how we ought to go about conceiving of gender (Godman, 2018; Haslanger, 2000). That is a claim at the meta‐level, about which concepts we should use.…”

The gender puzzles

“…2020A similar objection is raised by Marion Godman in “Gender as a Historical Kind: A Tale of Two Genders,” (Godman, 2018, p. 21).…”