German airport regulation: Framework agreements, civil law and the EU Directive

Littlechild, Stephen

doi:10.1016/j.jairtraman.2011.12.018

Cited by 12 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…Our capacity-enhancing results is also consistent with Sarmento and Brandao (2013) who show that airport-airline profit sharing may display the highest incentive for an airport to invest when compared to alternative vertical relations when the airport maximizes profit. In addition, our findings are consistent with several recent studies on "light-handed" airport regulation, 8 which identified commercial agreements between airlines and airports as a source of efficiency and welfare gains (Forsyth 2004, Littlechild 2012a, 2012b. The empirical investigation by found that, compared to airports without vertical arrangements with airlines, those with arrangements tend to handle more passengers and aircraft movements, have more gates but lower unit costs, and are more likely to be under public ownership.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 90%

Airport capacity choice under airport-airline vertical arrangements

Xiao

Zhang

2016

Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice

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This study investigates the effects of airport-airline vertical arrangements on airport capacity choices under demand uncertainty. A multi-stage game is analyzed, in which competing airlines contribute to capacity investments and at the same time share airport revenues. Our analytical results suggest that for a profit-maximizing airport, such a vertical arrangement leads to higher capacity although its profit may not be higher. For a welfare-maximizing airport, such an arrangement has no effect on capacity or welfare. Capital cost savings brought by airportairline cooperation, if any, always leads to higher capacity, higher profit for a profit-maximizing airport, and higher welfare in the case of a welfare-maximizing airport. Numerical simulations reveal that win-win outcomes may be achieved for an airport and its airlines without government intervention.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 90%

Airport capacity choice under airport-airline vertical arrangements

Xiao

Zhang

2016

Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice

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“…There is not yet experience with the latest EU Airport Charges Directive (European Union, 2009), and its applicability to smaller airports subject to competition may be questioned, but its approach is noteworthy (Littlechild, 2012). Rather than specifying price controls it establishes a procedure for regular consultation between an airport and its users about the structure and level of airport charges, and the quality of service provided.…”

Section: Further Evidence On Dispute Resolutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Australian airport regulation: Exploring the frontier

Littlechild

2012

Journal of Air Transport Management

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“…When airport charges are adjusted by a new policy, with higher prices than before, this fact can create a juridical dispute with airlines and only can be resolved if the country has an independent administrative council for economic defense and a strong antitrust law (Littlechild, 2012). For example, as made for German Airports, when applied the light-handed regulation and compared to Australian Regulation, Littlechild (2012) says that is necessary a framework agreement with an independent aviation regulatory agency monitoring investment, reducing litigation and defending the interests of passengers. Any increasing in airport charges could be interpreted as an action against public interest (Abeyratne, 2001), and on the other hand, the investment made to increase the social welfare can justify the higher prices?…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fare policies and a markup application based on airport cost

Fiaco

Silva

2019

TRANSPORTES

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A experiência de países desenvolvidos mostra que os administradores aeroportuários procuram aumentar sua lucratividade, e as Agências Reguladoras objetivam garantir qualidade, investimento e tarifas justas. Os Estados, que se interessam em ter aeroportos autossustentáveis, encontram na regulamentação para a iniciativa privada ou sociedade de capital misto a mudança que desejam. Com o objetivo de desenvolver um modelo de precificação da tarifa aeronáutica baseada no custo do aeroporto, este artigo apresenta uma aplicação do índice de Tornqvist e do método de precificação Markup para encontrar a oportunidade de preço do mercado. Sendo um dos objetivos específicos de comparar os resultados financeiros com base na Resolução No. 350/14 da ANAC com os resultados obtidos no modelo proposto. Para a previsão de demanda com o novo preço da tarifa, utilizou-se o conceito de elasticidade. O cenário utilizado foi o do Aeroporto de Campinas/Viracopos, de janeiro de 2014 até março de 2017. Durante o trimestre em que não há custos com construção de infraestrutura, o preço da tarifa é 0,04% maior do que o teto tarifário previsto pela ANAC. Durante períodos com custo de construção, a média da tarifa foi 2,4 vezes maior em relação ao preço do Agente Regulador. Um método independente e baseado em custo e na oportunidade de mercado, mas no qual o demonstrativo financeiro deva ser seja fiscalizado, mostra-se ser promissor quanto ao aumento da receita do aeroporto. Estabelecer parâmetros qualitativos pode ser a melhor opção para exigir a qualidade do bem-estar social dos passageiros, e caso essas metas não sejam atingidas, então multas podem ser aplicadas a administradora aeroportuária.

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German airport regulation: Framework agreements, civil law and the EU Directive

Cited by 12 publications

References 9 publications

Airport capacity choice under airport-airline vertical arrangements

Airport capacity choice under airport-airline vertical arrangements

Australian airport regulation: Exploring the frontier

Fare policies and a markup application based on airport cost

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