German Federalism in Historical Perspective: Federalism as a Substitute for a National State

Renzsch, Wolfgang

doi:10.2307/3330414

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…6 In Germany, however, the federal constitution calls for fiscal equalization, but the particular mechanism used for this purpose and its frequent changes over time are regulated by federal legislation negotiated between the federal and the state governments. They are, therefore, the outcome of intergovernmental negotiations in which the representatives of the regional and the federal governments fought over the distribution of tax revenues (Renzsch, 1991; see also Pitlik et al 2001;Renzsch, 1989;and Rothweiler, 1972). Political economy suggests that the political actors involved in these negotiations may have been primarily interested in the size and stability of the government budgets over which they command rather than the size and stability of state disposable incomes.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fiscal Federalism in Germany: Stabilization and Redistribution Before and After Unification

Hepp

Hagen

2011

Publius: The Journal of Federalism

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe provide empirical estimates of the risk-sharing and redistributive properties of the German federal fiscal system based on data from 1970 until 2006, with special attention to the effects of German unification. We find that tax revenue sharing between the states and the federal government and the fiscal equalization mechanism (Länderfinanzausgleich) together reduce differences in per-capita state incomes by 36.9 percent during period 1970 to 1994. After the full integration of East German states into the mechanism in 1995, the redistributive effects increase slightly to about 38.6 percent. With respect to the insurance effect of the German fiscal system, our results indicate that the federal fiscal system offsets 47 percent of an asymmetric shock to state per-capita incomes. This effect has significantly decreased after the inclusion of the East German states in 1995. Furthermore, we find that the German fiscal system provides almost perfect insurance for state government budgets against asymmetric revenue shocks; also, its redistributive effect with regard to the tax resources available to state governments is very strong.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fiscal Federalism in Germany: Stabilization and Redistribution Before and After Unification

Hepp

Hagen

2011

Publius: The Journal of Federalism

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“…However, until the 1970s regional autonomy remained confined to a few countries. In Austria and Germany, for example, decentralisation was partly imposed in the post-war period by the Allied Forces (Renzsch, 1989). The rest of Europe, despite coping with considerable and often increasing subnational tensions, remained mostly centralised.…”

Section: The Winding Road Towards Decentralisation In Europementioning

confidence: 99%

The economic returns of decentralisation: Government quality and the role of space

Rodríguez‐Pose

Muštra

2022

Environ Plan A

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Research on the impact of decentralisation has generally overlooked the fact that the economic returns of transferring powers and resources to subnational tiers of government greatly depend on the quality of the devolved government. Scholarly literature has also neglected that these returns may be similarly affected by the autonomy of neighbouring areas and their government quality. In this paper, we use panel data fixed effects analyses and spatial Durbin econometric models to assess the extent to which the economic returns of political and fiscal decentralisation in the European Union between 2000 and 2015 are mediated by local government quality and that of neighbouring regions. The results suggest that the economic benefits of regional autonomy are greater in regions with a better government quality, while regions with a low quality of government grow less, regardless of their level of decentralisation. The gains of decentralisation mainly accrue through indirect effects, as regions grow more if surrounded by other, more decentralised regions than through their own level of decentralisation. In all cases, local government quality is a powerful driver of growth, irrespective of whether a region is considered individually or in relationship to its neighbours.

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“…64 Kod suvremenih "devolutivnih federacija" mogli bismo eventualno u slučaju Indije govoriti o postojanju provincija i nekih 555 "prinčevskih država" koje su činile Britansku Indiju, ali te su države postale dijelom nezavisne Indije odmah po donošenju Zakona o nezavisnosti Indije, koji je donio britanski parlament 1947. godine. 65 Iako su provincijska zakonodavna tijela izabrala predstavnike u ustavotvornu skupštinu, one nakon toga nisu imale nikakvu ulogu u donošenju Ustava Indije, već je on donesen od ustavotvorne skupštine, bez njihove naknadne suglasnosti.…”

Section: Ustavotvorni Subjekt U Suvremenim Federalnim Sustavima Nastalim Devolutivnim Putemunclassified

Mi, Narod Federacije! Ustavotvorna Vlast U Klasičnim I Suvremenim Federacijama

Podolnjak

2021

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Regardless of the earlier assumptions about the obsolescence of the classic federal theory, the paper emphasizes the contemporary significance and relevance of federalism. Europe is the epicentre of modern federalization processes, not only when it comes to the European Union, but also a number of European countries such as Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom. The paper points out the fundamental distinction between the classic and modern federalism, which has its origin in the fact that federal systems 'arise' differently as a result of opposite processes of federalization and that in this sense we can distinguish between classic “integrative” and modern “devolutive” federalism. The basic assumptions of the paper are that 1) these two federalism patterns originally differ in the character of the basic constitutive act of the federal union with regard to the subject of creating a federation, and 2) because contemporary federations are “federal states without a federal foundation” this difference is not noticeable today. On the contrary, it has largely disappeared, and in this way, the difference between classic and modern federalism is actually bridged.

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German Federalism in Historical Perspective: Federalism as a Substitute for a National State

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Fiscal Federalism in Germany: Stabilization and Redistribution Before and After Unification

Fiscal Federalism in Germany: Stabilization and Redistribution Before and After Unification

The economic returns of decentralisation: Government quality and the role of space

Mi, Narod Federacije! Ustavotvorna Vlast U Klasičnim I Suvremenim Federacijama

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