Germany and the Future of European Security

Bluth, Christoph

doi:10.1057/9781403905222

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…German diplomacy was thus very active in international institutions, acting upon every apparent opportunity to promise conciliation. Germany especially engaged within the context of the Western European Union (WEU), where it contributed to various diplomatic initiatives with the intention of establishing a climate for negotiation with the Iraqi regime (Bluth 2000:58). Failing to do so, Genscher proposed a meeting of the European Community (EC) foreign ministers to consider a new initiative intended to persuade Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait (Duffield 1998:179; Bluth 2000:59).…”

Section: German Foreign Policy In the Post‐cold War Eramentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Despite a short episode of military engagement, a cautious interpretation is still to be advised. One observer points out that “the German role in military operations was so limited that it could almost be called token” (Bluth 2000:69). Once again, contingencies for a stronger German role with a substantive military engagement ran up against the limits of the culture of reticence (Lantis 2002b:87).…”

Section: German Foreign Policy In the Post‐cold War Eramentioning

confidence: 99%

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Germans as Venutians: The Culture of German Foreign Policy Behavior

Malici

2006

Foreign Policy Analysis

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The end of the Cold War eliminated many of the external constraints that had straitjacketed German policy during the Cold War era. At the same time, unification augmented Germany's already substantial power base. In light of these changed geopolitical circumstances, it was only logical for the dominant theory of security studies, namely realism, to expect a reorientation in German foreign policy behavior toward unilateralism and increased levels of power politics. Yet these expectations proved wrong. This article argues that German foreign policy behavior in the post‐Cold War era can be ascribed to a foreign policy culture of reticence—a culture of restraint and accommodation that can be traced to well‐defined sets of fundamental beliefs of the German decision‐making elite. This article systematically examines these beliefs in the post‐Cold War era, relates them to foreign policy choices, and concludes with a plea for increased attention to ideational variables.

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Section: German Foreign Policy In the Post‐cold War Eramentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: German Foreign Policy In the Post‐cold War Eramentioning

confidence: 99%

Germans as Venutians: The Culture of German Foreign Policy Behavior

Malici

2006

Foreign Policy Analysis

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“…In this way, civilian control would prohibit the armed forces from seeking "hegemonic ambitions" and prevent troops being sent abroad absent a clear mandate based on international law. 12 Additionally, German law draws a clear, legalistic separation between offensive military action and law enforcement authorities. 13 This confusing legal framework and unclear delineation of responsibility complicates German efforts to employ military forces abroad.…”

Section: Chapter 2 -Cold War Legacy -Modern Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The New Special Relationship": Redefining America's Strategic Partnership With Germany"

Sotiriadis¹

2015

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Germany is the undisputed economic and political powerhouse of Europe. However, the balance of Berlin's instruments of national power is disproportionate, underscoring a long-standing doctrine of military restraint. President Joachim Gauck's 2013-2014 calls for Germany to assume more global responsibility have materialized via several forms: Germany's significant contributions in Afghanistan, response to Ebola, delivery of weapons to the Iraqi Kurds, and attempts to diplomatically resolve the crisis in Ukraine. As Germany's influence on the international scene increases, so must its commitment to invest, train, and employ military forces in defense of the international order from which it has so greatly benefited. The United States should encourage Germany in this regard and must take into account power shifts in the European status quo. Washington should deepen its political, economic, and military ties to Germany, investing in the long-term "special relationship" of the future.

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“…Russia was not prepared to subordinate its own security problems to a collective security regime. 22 The failure to resolve the most basic questions of the principles according to which a new European security order should be created meant that no functional collective security institutions could be created. The difficulties in constructing a regime of common security in Europe require an analysis of the sources of conflict between Russia and the United States.…”

Section: Common Security In Europementioning

confidence: 99%

Germany and the Future of European Security

Cited by 5 publications

References 0 publications

Germans as Venutians: The Culture of German Foreign Policy Behavior

Germans as Venutians: The Culture of German Foreign Policy Behavior

The New Special Relationship": Redefining America's Strategic Partnership With Germany"

The security dilemma revisited: a paradigm for international security in the twenty-first century?

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