The British decision to go to war against Iraq with the United States has been widely criticized for being based on inaccurate and exaggerated assessments of the threat posed by Iraq. This article shows that the case for military action made by the British government was based on a measured analysis of the threat, on the conviction that the continued containment of Iraq through sanctions was not effective or morally acceptable, and that the human rights violations of the Iraqi regime were of a such a scale that they could no longer be tolerated. The article then assesses the judgements of the British government in the light of the information that has come to light since the war against Iraq in 2003.

No abstract

In his article, Matthew Fuhrmann challenges the conventional wisdom about the relationship between civilian nuclear cooperation and nuclear weapons proliferation. 1 The literature on nuclear proliferation focuses on the demand side and explains decisions to acquire nuclear weapons on the basis of security threats, hegemonic ambitions, national identity, or related factors. 2 The role of civilian technical nuclear cooperation is generally discounted as a motivating factor in the acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities. Fuhrmann argues that there is a causal connection between peaceful nuclear cooperation and proliferation and that civilian nuclear assistance over time increases the likelihood that states will initiate nuclear weapons programs. The implications of the notion that civilian nuclear technology promotes nuclear proliferation are disturbing, because they lead to the conclusion that the central bargain of the nuclear nonproliferation regime-namely, access to civilian nuclear technology in return for the renunciation of nuclear weapons-is not viable and that instead the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) might be a vector for the spread of nuclear weapons technology.The central thesis of Fuhrmann's article seems implausible. Nuclear proliferation is exceedingly rare. One hundred eighty-nine states are members of the NPT, including ªve nuclear states. There are only four states that are not members of the NPT and that have nuclear weapons. Of the four, the last one to make the decision to go nuclear and that received civilian nuclear assistance started its nuclear program in 1972. North Korea went nuclear in the absence of civilian nuclear assistance.

No abstract

[Adopting] unification as the central goal of policy toward the Koreas . … would constitute the first step on the road toward a resolution of the crisis on the peninsula.