Gettier for Justification

Abstract

I will present a problem for any externalist evidentialism that allows for accidental possession of evidence. There are Gettier cases for justication. I will describe two such cases -cases involving veridical hallucination. An analysis of the cases is given, along the lines of (reliabilist) virtue epistemology (cf. Sosa, Greco). The cases show that certain externalist evidentialist accounts of justication do not provide sufcient conditions. The reason lies in the fact that one can be luckily in possession of evidence, and then one will not have a justied belief. Justied belief requires an anti-luck condition on possession of evidence. This opens up the prospects of a unied virtue-epistemology covering both knowledge and justication.

Fake Barns and False Dilemmas

“…Also, see Gibbons (2001) for a discussion of the role that knowledge plays in intentional action. For criticism of these approaches, see Hofmann (forthcoming) and Hughes (forthcoming). Hughes uses environmental luck cases to attack these views.…”

Gettier Cases and Evidence

“…Thus, they think that while the thinker wouldn't know that the pen was blue, the fact that it was seems like the kind of thing that could be the thinker's reason for believing various things about the pen. Mitova (2015) and Hofman (2014) use veritic luck cases (e.g., Coins) to make a similar point. If we think of reasons or evidence as facts, perhaps having a reason or having some evidence is just a matter of having an attitude that is correct or accurate.…”