Getting a Seat at the Table: The Origins of Universal Participation and Modern Multilateral Conferences

Jurkovich, Michelle

doi:10.1163/19426720-02003003

Cited by 39 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…This result shows that the optimal quota may be implementable when the IO can conduct investigations. Furthermore, the result shows that enforcement leverage magnifies the effect of 42 See Finnemore and Jurkovich (2014) for an empirical discussion of inclusivity in international agreements. 43 Our inclusion of investigative resources places our model in line with regulation and crime deterrence models such as Becker (1968) and Mookherjee and Png (1994) where regulators must allocate investigative resources in addition to penalties.…”

Section: Mechanisms With Limited Investigationsmentioning

confidence: 97%

Designing the Optimal International Climate Agreement with Variability in Commitments

McAllister¹,

Schnakenberg²

2020

Preprint

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We analyze the design of an international climate agreement. In particular, we consider two goals of such an agreement: overcoming free-rider problems and adjusting for differences in mitigation costs between countries. Previous work suggests that it is difficult to achieve both of these goals at once under asymmetric information because countries free ride by exaggerating their abatement costs. We argue that independent information collection (investigations) by an international organization can mitigate this problem. In fact, though the best implementable climate agreement without investigations fails to adjust for individual differences even with significant enforcement power, a mechanism with investigations allows such adjustment and can allow implementation of the socially optimal agreement. Furthermore, when the organization has significant enforcement power the optimal agreement is achievable with minimal investigation costs. The results suggest that discussions about institutions for climate cooperation should focus on information collection as well as enforcement.

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Section: Mechanisms With Limited Investigationsmentioning

confidence: 97%

Designing the Optimal International Climate Agreement with Variability in Commitments

McAllister¹,

Schnakenberg²

2020

Preprint

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“…The Hague system , in contrast, featured dramatically different practices. Conferences were not reserved for the great powers alone, but attendance – especially by the second conference – was assumed to be universal (Finnemore and Jurkovich, 2014; Pouliot and Thérien, 2015). Negotiations were not dominated by great power clubs meeting in private, but by a series of formal meetings, during which minutes were kept, motions introduced, and votes taken.…”

Section: The Hague System and The Roots Of The Liberal Ordermentioning

confidence: 99%

‘Most Potent and Irresistible Moral Influence’: Public Opinion, Rhetorical Coercion, and the Hague Conferences

MacDonald

2020

Global Policy

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International relations scholars debate whether the current liberal order can adapt to power shifts among the great powers. Yet historically, contestation among the great powers has often revolved around the question of whether the international system should be organized along liberal and institutional lines in the first place. In this paper, I examine great power negotiation strategies at the 1899 and 1907 Hague conferences, an often overlooked yet critical episode of liberal order-building. As rising powers shuffled the great power ranks, many hoped that the Hague conferences would prevent arms racing, reduce the barbarity of war, and promote peaceful solutions to international crises. Champions of liberal rules and institutions used principled persuasion, appealing to shared norms and collective identities. They also engaged in rhetorical coercion, seeking at times to shame potential obstructionists. Yet the conferences revealed the profound limitations of these soft-power based negotiation strategies. For a brief moment in 1899, circumstances allowed champions of the Hague system to persuade states to sign on to the laws of war and to embarrass states into accepting arbitration. Yet by 1907, conditions had changed and obstructionists were able to mobilize broad coalitions to block significant change. The Hague conferences highlight the importance of interstate coalitional networks in institutional adaptation. Policy Implications • States seeking institutional adaptation should use principled persuasion when preferences are relatively aligned and there is a strong normative consensus in favor of reform. • States seeking institutional adaptation should use rhetorical coercion when they are not acting in an obviously hypocritical manner and the target has clearly violated a widely shared normative principle.

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“…As mentioned above, the idea of equal participation of states is one of the key principles of multilateralism. Multilateralism has a strong historical connection to the notion of the equality of states; it emerged as an antithesis to the collective domination by great powers around the turn of the twentieth century (Finnemore and Jurkovich, ). Given the connection between multilateralism and equal participation of states, it is understandable that there has been a growing debate about whether multilateralism can endure in the age of multipolarity.…”

Section: Diplomacy Multilateralism and Multipolaritymentioning

confidence: 99%

Multipolarity and the Future of Multilateralism: Towards ‘Thick’ Peacekeeping in the Donbas Conflict

Hadano

2020

Global Policy

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This article contributes to research on the relationship between multipolarity and multilateralism. One aim of this article is to consider the role of multilateralism in the age of multipolarity by investigating Russia's approach to multilateralism, especially in the context of the Donbas conflict. Russia has been a staunch supporter of a polycentric world order. Thus, an analysis of its attitude towards multilateralism provides insights into the role of multilateralism in the emerging multipolar world. It will be argued that, while convergence of interests and equal participation of states cannot be assumed in the age of multipolarity, multilateralism can still facilitate policy coordination among states, including rising powers, and provide legitimacy to their policy decisions. Another aim is to explore what peacekeepingan international practice reflective of multilateralismcan deliver in the multipolarising world. This article examines recent debates over the deployment of a peacekeeping mission to eastern Ukraine and argues that peacekeeping can not only help achieve security policy coordination among states, including rising powers, but also help create a common diplomatic culture and hence a sense of we-feeling among them, which may in turn develop into an inclusive regional security framework.

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Getting a Seat at the Table: The Origins of Universal Participation and Modern Multilateral Conferences

Cited by 39 publications

References 1 publication

Designing the Optimal International Climate Agreement with Variability in Commitments

Designing the Optimal International Climate Agreement with Variability in Commitments

‘Most Potent and Irresistible Moral Influence’: Public Opinion, Rhetorical Coercion, and the Hague Conferences

Multipolarity and the Future of Multilateralism: Towards ‘Thick’ Peacekeeping in the Donbas Conflict

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