Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation 2017
DOI: 10.1145/3033274.3085104
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Gibbard-Satterthwaite Success Stories and Obvious Strategyproofness

Abstract: The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem (Gibbard, 1973;Satterthwaite, 1975) holds that dictatorship is the only Pareto optimal and strategyproof social choice function on the full domain of preferences. Much of the work in mechanism design aims at getting around this impossibility theorem. Three grand success stories stand out. On the domains of single peaked preferences, of house matching, and of quasilinear preferences, there are appealing Pareto optimal and strategyproof social choice functions. We … Show more

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Cited by 32 publications
(73 citation statements)
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“…OSP mechanism with monitoring (without losses to the approximation guarantee, resp.). Thus, for Combinatorial Auctions (CAs) with additive bidders our mechanism with monitoring beats the lower bound proved by Bade and Gonczarowski [2016] for OSP mechanisms. 5 Just as the weaker notion of verification has been shown to be useful in the context of truthful CAs without money , our result shows that OSP with monitoring matches the best-known (poynomial-time) approximations achieved not only by truthful mechanisms [Krysta et al, 2015, Lehmann et al, 2002, but also by general algorithms [Hurkens andSchrijver, 1989, Halldórsson, 1999].…”
Section: A General Positive Resultssupporting
confidence: 58%
“…OSP mechanism with monitoring (without losses to the approximation guarantee, resp.). Thus, for Combinatorial Auctions (CAs) with additive bidders our mechanism with monitoring beats the lower bound proved by Bade and Gonczarowski [2016] for OSP mechanisms. 5 Just as the weaker notion of verification has been shown to be useful in the context of truthful CAs without money , our result shows that OSP with monitoring matches the best-known (poynomial-time) approximations achieved not only by truthful mechanisms [Krysta et al, 2015, Lehmann et al, 2002, but also by general algorithms [Hurkens andSchrijver, 1989, Halldórsson, 1999].…”
Section: A General Positive Resultssupporting
confidence: 58%
“…To our knowledge, the first instance of an impossibility-by-pruning proof with more than two possible preference lists/types for any of the agents is in an impossibility result for OSP-implementation of combinatorial auctions inBade and Gonczarowski (2017). While that paper is much newer than any other result in our paper, the first draft of that proof predated the proof given in this appendix.…”
mentioning
confidence: 82%
“…In school choice settings, there exist school priorities such that no mechanism OSP-implements the deferred acceptance algorithm for those priorities (Ashlagi and Gonczarowski, 2015). Bade and Gonczarowski (2016) characterize OSP mechanisms for house matching, and in social choice environments with single-peaked preferences. Pycia and Troyan (2016) characterize OSP mechanisms in general settings with no transfers and 'rich' preferences, and propose a stronger solution concept (strong obvious strategy-proofness).…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%