Global Capital and National Governments

Mosley, Layna

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511615672

Cited by 431 publications

(309 citation statements)

References 325 publications

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“…First, as debt servicing eats up a greater portion of foreign exchange, FDI provides much needed hard currency. Second, developing countries face closer scrutiny by international capital markets (Mosley 2003) leading to more direct volatile responses in capital flows (Ahlquist 2006) and interest rates (Sobel 1999). Not accommodating multinationals sends a negative signal to market actors.…”

Section: Theoretical Perspectivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

FDI and the costs of contract enforcement in developing countries

Ahlquist

Prakash

2009

Policy Sci

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This article examines the relationship between foreign direct investment and host countries' contracting institutions, the rule systems which govern commercial transactions between private actors. Given their liability of foreignness and costly exit options, we suggest that multinational corporations have incentives to influence the formal contracting environment in host countries. Further, host governments are more likely to respond to multinationals' wishes when they are more dependent on foreign capital markets. We draw on the World Bank's Lex Mundi dataset (Djankov et al. 2003) on microlevel contracting environment for private actors. Our analysis of a cross section of 98 developing countries suggests that FDI is associated with lower contract enforcement costs, particularly when the host country is more indebted.

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Section: Theoretical Perspectivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

FDI and the costs of contract enforcement in developing countries

Ahlquist

Prakash

2009

Policy Sci

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“…External pressures connected to funding or membership in the EU have driven top down requirements regarding inclusion in the nations with lower levels of national capital included in this study (Dunne, 2014;Mosley, 2003;Murphy, 1997;Richardson & Ngwenya, 2013). Mandates do not always engender a shared vision of the spirit behind the directive, and to be fair, not even the chief "architect" of inclusion in the United Kingdom remains a staunch advocate of it; she is quoted as calling inclusion "disastrous" (Allan, 2012).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Untitled

2018

EPASR

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“…Additionally, global capital mobility can affect neoliberal economic policies. Mosley (2003) finds that, in the developing world, financial markets exert a considerable influence on government policy. To control for global capital mobility, we include the Chinn-Ito Index (2008), which is a measure of financial capital openness.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The large number of voters opposing strict market reforms results in mandate holders moderating doctrinaire neoliberal reforms, especially micro-level economic policies, because of global financial markets tendency to exert macroeconomic discipline in developing countries (Kaplan 2013;Mahon 1996;Mosley 2003;Wibbels 2006). Although we expect there are limits on clarity of responsibility, we contend that rightist leaders holding mandates will call greater attention to more popular measures that reflect the right party's strengths including managing public order and security, pledging support for conservative social policies, and promoting government programs serving the very poor, all as means to win elections and stay in office (Meléndez 2014;Koivumaeki 2014;Wiesehomeier and Doyle 2014).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Based on literature for the developing world, the financial community particularly opposes changes at the macro level. Foreign investors rail against macro-level reforms that restrict trade openness, increase government deficit spending, and raise levels of inflation and price controls, as such policies have the most effect on their economic bottom line (Kaplan 2013 ;Mahon 1996;Mosley 2003;Wibbels 2006). Because foreign investors likely will respond with large capital flight against governments that institute macro-level policy changes, mandate holders will tend to uphold macro-level reforms.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Political Mandate and Clarity of Responsibility: Economic Policies under Rightist Governments in Latin America

Biglaiser

McGauvran

2022

Lat. American Res. Rev.

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Since the mid-1990s, some rightist governments in Latin America have adhered to a strict market orientation while others have shown less attachment to doctrinaire neoliberal policies, a puzzle as rightists are expected to favor minimal government intervention in the economy. In an environment over the past two decades in which market-oriented policies, in general, have grown increasingly unpopular with many Latin Americans, we contend that rightists have less political cover to endorse neoliberal policies. Using panel data for eighteen Latin American countries from 1995 to 2015, we find that, because of the clarity of responsibility that occurs under political mandates and the unpopularity of market reforms, mandate-holding rightist governments will tend to go against their ideological preferences and decrease neoliberal policies. Our findings indicate that as presidential vote margins increase and responsibility for unpopular economic policies becomes clearer, rightist executives will be less willing to support such policies, but only to a point. The results suggest that clarity of responsibility can influence presidential decision-making concerning unpopular policies, especially microeconomic policies, but this influence diminishes as presidents become more electorally secure.A partir de mediados de la década de los 90, algunos gobiernos latinoamericanos de derecha han adoptado políticas estrictas de apertura comercial, mientras que otros se han mostrado más alejados de adoptar políticas neoliberales. Esto es un elemento relevante de análisis ya que se espera que los gobiernos de derecha estén en contra de la intervención del gobierno en la economía. Usando una base de datos panel sobre 18 países latinoamericanos para el periodo de 1995 a 2015, encontramos que los gobiernos de derecha actúan en contra de sus preferencias ideológicas disminuyendo políticas neoliberales por dos razones: la claridad que los mandatarios tienen sobre sus responsabilidades y la impopularidad de las reformas de libre mercado en Latinoamérica. Nuestros hallazgos indican que, si el margen de votos en las elecciones presidenciales incrementa y el sentido de responsabilidad sobre la adopción de políticas económicas impopulares es claro, los gobernantes de derecha estarán menos dispuestos a adoptar este tipo de políticas de libre mercado.Since the late 1990s, many studies have investigated the economic policies of leftist governments in Latin America.

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Global Capital and National Governments

Cited by 431 publications

References 325 publications

FDI and the costs of contract enforcement in developing countries

FDI and the costs of contract enforcement in developing countries

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Political Mandate and Clarity of Responsibility: Economic Policies under Rightist Governments in Latin America

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