Global E‐waste trade

Rothe, Dawn L.

doi:10.1111/j.1745-9133.2010.00650.x

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 13 publications

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“…In recent years, green criminologists have begun to explore issues related to e-waste as a green crime (Bisschop, 2012; Gibbs, McGarrell, Axelrod, & Rivers, 2011; Rothe, 2010). Those studies address the general environmental problems posed by e-waste and its regulation.…”

Section: Some Specific Areas Of Neglect In the Green Criminological Lmentioning

confidence: 99%

Acknowledging Female Victims of Green Crimes: Environmental Exposure of Women to Industrial Pollutants

Lynch

2016

Feminist Criminology

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Green criminology has drawn attention to the widespread forms of green victimization. However, green criminology has neglected female victims of green crimes, and area to which feminist criminologists can contribute. To draw attention to these issues, this article examines the medical and epidemiological literature published since 2010 related to the forms of green victimization women experience. Implications for examining the green victimization of economically marginalized female populations, the need to integrate feminist and green criminological research, and suggests that feminist analysis can also inform ecofeminist studies by more fully elaborating a position of the environmental/green victimization of women are presented.

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Section: Some Specific Areas Of Neglect In the Green Criminological Lmentioning

confidence: 99%

Acknowledging Female Victims of Green Crimes: Environmental Exposure of Women to Industrial Pollutants

Lynch

2016

Feminist Criminology

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Regulating transnational corporate bribery: Anti-bribery and corruption in the UK and Germany

Lord

2013

Crime Law Soc Change

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Recent large-scale cases involving multinational corporations such as the BAE Systems and Siemens bribery scandals illustrate the difficulties faced by the UK and German sovereign states in controlling complex trans-national and multi-jurisdictional crimes. This article analyses the mixture of enforcement (e.g. criminal prosecution, civil sanctioning), self-regulatory (e.g. transnational business initiatives, corporate compliance) and hybrid (e.g. self-reporting, self-investigation) mechanisms that are emerging as part of UK and German responses to controlling transnational corporate bribery. This regulatory landscape incorporates a diverse array of direct and indirect state (e.g. investigatory and prosecutorial agencies) and non-state (e.g. private sector enterprises, non-governmental and intergovernmental organisations) 'regulatory' actors of varying levels of formality. Mechanisms of a self-regulatory nature vary in terms of their mandatory/voluntary requirements and manufactured/organic formation. However, there is an assumption that the emergence of a variety of enforcement, self-regulatory and innovative hybrid mechanisms is sufficient but in reality this is not the case. Instead, the key argument of the article is that while these mechanisms are aiding the response, they are likely to fail leading to the default position of accommodation by state agencies, even where the will to enforce the law is high.

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