Goal-oriented training affects decision-making processes in virtual and simulated fire and rescue environments.

Abstract

Decisions made by operational commanders at emergency incidents have been characterized as involving a period of information gathering followed by courses of action that are often generated without explicit plan formulation. We examined the efficacy of goal-oriented training in engendering explicit planning that would enable better communication at emergency incidents. While standard training mirrored current operational guidance, goal-oriented training incorporated "decision controls" that highlighted the importance of evaluating goals, anticipated consequences, and risk/benefit analyses once a potential course of action has been identified. In Experiment 1, 3 scenarios (a house fire, road traffic collision, and skip fire) were presented in a virtual environment, and in Experiment 2 they were recreated on the fireground. In Experiment 3, the house fire was recreated as a "live burn," and incident commanders and their crews responded to this scenario as an emergency incident. In all experiments, groups given standard training showed the reported tendency to move directly from information gathering to action, whereas those given goal-oriented training were more likely to develop explicit plans and show anticipatory situational awareness. These results indicate that training can be readily modified to promote explicit plan formulation that could facilitate plan sharing between incident commanders and their teams.

Decision‐making in multi‐agency groups at simulated major incident emergencies: In situ analysis of adherence to UK doctrine

“…This is a limitation of Study 1. However, the close correspondence between decision‐making processes in some operational and simulated environments, identified using similar methodology to the present studies (Cohen‐Hatton et al, ; Cohen‐Hatton & Honey, ), suggests that use of context appropriate simulated environments can reveal important similarities to real incidents (Alison et al, ). Of more immediate relevance, however, is the close similarity between the overall pattern of results from Study 1 (involving Exercise Wales Gold 1 and 2) and Study 2 (Exercise Unified Response; Figure ).…”

“…One obvious target is to modify policy and guidance to ensure that (a) options and contingencies are consistently explored, and (b) the rationale for prospective courses of action are routinely and explicitly assessed against goals, anticipated consequences, and a risk/benefit analysis (cf. Cohen‐Hatton & Honey, ). Cohen‐Hatton and Honey () showed that training firefighters to use such explicit assessments (which they called “decision controls”), before committing to a course of action, increased the use of reflective decision‐making relative to recognition‐primed or intuitive decision‐making.…”

“…Cohen‐Hatton & Honey, ). Cohen‐Hatton and Honey () showed that training firefighters to use such explicit assessments (which they called “decision controls”), before committing to a course of action, increased the use of reflective decision‐making relative to recognition‐primed or intuitive decision‐making. The implementation of such decision controls in a group decision‐making context might also yield greater reflective decision‐making, involving appropriate consideration of alternative options and goals.…”

“…To take one example, the study of decision‐making in individual firefighters has revealed marked departures from normative models that are similar to the JDM: Firefighter decision‐making often reflects past experience and is recognition‐primed and intuitive rather than being based on a process of evaluation and reflection. This observation was originally highlighted through an analysis of the retrospective reports of firefighters (Klein, Calderwood, & MacGregor, ; see also, Klein, ); but it is also evident when decision‐making was investigated in situ at real emergency incidents (Cohen‐Hatton, Butler, & Honey, ; see also, Rake & Njå, ) and simulated incidents (Cohen‐Hatton & Honey, ). Similarly, the failure to consider alternative interpretations of evidence has been widely documented in laboratory studies (e.g., Wason, ) and in police investigations (e.g., Dando & Ormerod, ).…”

Ubiquitous Working: Do Work Versus Non-work Environments Affect Decision-Making and Concentration?

“…The environment was manipulated using two virtual environments (see also Moskaliuk et al, 2017 ). Virtual environment technologies are useful tools for psychological research, as they are able to create sufficiently realistic situations while being able to control for confounding variables ( Blascovich et al, 2002 ) and have already been applied in various research areas (e.g., Cho et al, 2002 ; Klinger et al, 2005 ; Slater, 2009 ; Cohen-Hatton and Honey, 2015 ). In the work environment condition, participants navigated through a virtual office environment.…”