Four experiments with rats examined the origin of outcome-selective Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer (PIT). Experiment 1 used a standard procedure, where outcomes were embedded within extended conditioned stimuli (CSs), to demonstrate the basic effect: Pavlovian stimuli augmented instrumental lever presses that had been paired with the same outcomes. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that after instrumental conditioning, whereas a conditioned stimulus (CS) trained using a backward conditioning procedure produced outcome-selective PIT, forward conditioning with a CS did not. These results are consistent with the idea that backward conditioning results in the outcome provoking its associated instrumental response during the CS and thereby allows a stimulus-response association to be acquired that directly generates outcome-selective PIT at test. Experiment 4 provided direct support for the assumptions that underlie this stimulus-response analysis. These results, and other paradoxical effects of the Pavlovian relationship, are incongruent with accounts of outcome-selective PIT that rely on a stimulus-outcome-response chain.

These results have clear implications for understanding operational decision making as it occurs in situ and suggest a need for future guidance and training to acknowledge the role of reflexive processes.

Decisions made by operational commanders at emergency incidents have been characterized as involving a period of information gathering followed by courses of action that are often generated without explicit plan formulation. We examined the efficacy of goal-oriented training in engendering explicit planning that would enable better communication at emergency incidents. While standard training mirrored current operational guidance, goal-oriented training incorporated "decision controls" that highlighted the importance of evaluating goals, anticipated consequences, and risk/benefit analyses once a potential course of action has been identified. In Experiment 1, 3 scenarios (a house fire, road traffic collision, and skip fire) were presented in a virtual environment, and in Experiment 2 they were recreated on the fireground. In Experiment 3, the house fire was recreated as a "live burn," and incident commanders and their crews responded to this scenario as an emergency incident. In all experiments, groups given standard training showed the reported tendency to move directly from information gathering to action, whereas those given goal-oriented training were more likely to develop explicit plans and show anticipatory situational awareness. These results indicate that training can be readily modified to promote explicit plan formulation that could facilitate plan sharing between incident commanders and their teams.

When major incident emergencies occur in the UK (e.g., a terrorist attack), senior representatives convene from local emergency services, civil resource organizations, health agencies, and government. These groups make decisions that minimize the societal and economic impacts of major incidents. Their adherence to UK doctrine was assessed using video footage of 18 groups responding to a major incident in a simulation suite, and six groups responding to a large-scale exercise. There were marked between-group differences in the sequencing of decision-making activities, and limited consideration of alternative courses of action. These results provide an impetus for future policy, guidance, and training to address (a) between-group inconsistency in decision processes and (b) the lack of consideration of alternative courses of action.This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.