Going It Alone? Strategic Entry under Mixed Electoral Rules

Ferrara, Federico; Herron, Erik S.

doi:10.1111/j.0092-5853.2005.00107.x

Cited by 104 publications

(41 citation statements)

References 54 publications

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“…From the perspective of candidates, dual candidacies provide individual‐level gains from cooperation that involve greater electoral security and additional visibility and status. They thus trigger contamination effects that flow from the list tier to nominal tier considerations (Ferrara and Herron ; Herron and Nishikawa ; Krauss, Nemoto, and Pekkanen ; Manow ). They render individual legislators particularly mindful of collective vote‐seeking needs.…”

Section: The Supplementary Nature Of Geographic Representationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Geographic Representation in Party‐Dominated Legislatures: A Quantitative Text Analysis of Parliamentary Questions in the German Bundestag

Zittel

Nyhuis

Baumann

2019

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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Political representation in European democracies is widely considered partisan and collectivist. This article, however, stresses that there is more to the representative process in European democracies than just its textbook version. It emphasizes the role of geographic representation as a complementary strategy in party‐dominated legislatures that is characterized by two distinct features. First, legislators employ distinct opportunities to participate in legislative contexts to signal attention to geographic constituents without disrupting party unity. Second, these activities are motivated by individual‐ and district‐level characteristics that supplement electoral‐system‐level sources of geographic representation. We empirically test and corroborate this argument for the German case on the basis of a content analysis of parliamentary questions in the 17th German Bundestag (2009–13). In this analysis, we show that higher levels of localness among legislators and higher levels of electoral volatility in districts result in increased geographic representation.

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Section: The Supplementary Nature Of Geographic Representationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Geographic Representation in Party‐Dominated Legislatures: A Quantitative Text Analysis of Parliamentary Questions in the German Bundestag

Zittel

Nyhuis

Baumann

2019

Legislative Studies Qtrly

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“… 10 Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Conaghan 1995; Ferrara and Herron 2005; Golder 2006a; Hicken and Stoll 2011; Samuels 2002; Shugart and Carey 1992. …”

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confidence: 99%

Why Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Presidential Systems?

Kellam¹

2015

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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Why do political parties join coalitions to support other parties’ presidential candidates if presidents, once elected, are not bound to their pre-electoral pledges? This article argues that policy agreements made publicly between coalition partners during the campaign help parties pursue policy goals. However, parties cannot use pre-electoral coalitions to secure access to patronage, pork and government benefits under the control of presidents because they cannot hold presidents accountable to these agreements. Quantitative analysis of Latin American electoral coalitions demonstrates that political parties are more likely to form presidential electoral coalitions as the ideological distance between them decreases. Yet presidential electoral coalitions tend not to include non-programmatic political parties, even though such office-oriented parties are unconstrained by ideological considerations.

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“…Early work on mixed electoral systems has suggested that the effect of both elements—PR and plurality or majority vote—can be analyzed separately, assuming that mixed systems are not much more than the combination of two distinct mechanisms (for instance Moser 1995, 377; Moser and Scheiner 2004; Reed 1999; Stratmann and Baur 2002). 3 Others have shown interactions between both parts of mixed systems, addressed as contamination (Cox and Schoppa 2002; Ferrara and Herron 2005; Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005; Herron and Nishikawa 2001; Rose, Munro, and White 2001, and many others) 4 . Both models expect that mixed systems lead to overall outcomes in between PR and plurality/majority vote.…”

Section: Mixed Electoral Systems and Their Effectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Are Mixed Electoral Systems the Best Choice for Central and Eastern Europe or the Reason for Defective Party Systems?

Bochsler

2009

Politics & Policy

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Mixed electoral systems have been celebrated enthusiastically in the literature and by political practitioners, arguing that they combine the best of both worlds with regards to several aspects of political representation. This article calls this view into question, arguing that the mixed incentives of mixed electoral systems might hamper the stabilization and institutionalization of party systems in young democracies. Empirical results from 19 democracies in Central and Eastern Europe suggest that the learning and stabilization effect that is exerted through simple electoral systems fails under mixed systems. Using a variance model analysis, this study rejects the common belief that mixed systems lead to more moderate party systems with regards to party system fractionalization. Rather, outcomes under mixed systems vary much more widely than under proportional representation, are associated with higher disproportionality, and tend to increase volatility. Los sistemas electorales mixtos, que combinan sistemas electorales de mayoría con los de representación proporcional (RP), han sido alabados con entusiasmo por la literatura y los políticos, argumentando que combinan lo mejor de ambos mundos con relación a los diversos aspectos de la representación política. Este artículo cuestiona tal punto de vista, señalando que los incentivos contradictorios de los sistemas electorales mixtos podrían dificultar la estabilización e institucionalización de los sistemas de partido en democracias emergentes. Los resultados empíricos de diecinueve democracias en Europa Central y del Este sugieren que el efecto de aprendizaje y de estabilización que es ejercido en los sistemas electorales simples fracasa bajo los sistemas mixtos. Utilizando un análisis de modelos de varianza, este estudio rechaza la creencia común que los sistemas mixtos conducen a un sistema de partidos más moderado en referencia a su grado de fragmentación. En cambio, bajo sistemas mixtos, los resultados varían mucho más extensamente que bajo RP. Más aún, los sistemas mixtos están asociados con una superior desproporcionalidad que en RP y tienden a incrementar la volatilidad.

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Going It Alone? Strategic Entry under Mixed Electoral Rules

Cited by 104 publications

References 54 publications

Geographic Representation in Party‐Dominated Legislatures: A Quantitative Text Analysis of Parliamentary Questions in the German Bundestag

Geographic Representation in Party‐Dominated Legislatures: A Quantitative Text Analysis of Parliamentary Questions in the German Bundestag

Why Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Presidential Systems?

Are Mixed Electoral Systems the Best Choice for Central and Eastern Europe or the Reason for Defective Party Systems?

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