Proceedings of the International Conference on Formal Ontology in Information Systems - Volume 2001 2001
DOI: 10.1145/505168.505173
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Gol

Abstract: Every domain-specific ontology must use as a framework some upper-level ontology which describes the most general, domain-independent categories of reality. In the present paper we sketch a new type of upper-level ontology, which is intended to be the basis of a knowledge modelling language COL (for: 'General Ontological Language'). It turns out that the upperlevel ontology underlying standard modelling languages such as KIF, F-Logic and CycL is restricted to the ontology of sets. Set theory has considerable m… Show more

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Cited by 42 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…For a complete and detailed presentation of GOL and GFO, one should refer to [3,4]. For a comparison between GFO and other upper-level ontologies, such as the IEEE Standard Upper Ontology, KIF, Sowa, Russel and Norvig and LADSEB (that can be considered a preliminary version of DOLCE [10]), one should refer to [3].…”
Section: Background: Ontological Categoriesmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…For a complete and detailed presentation of GOL and GFO, one should refer to [3,4]. For a comparison between GFO and other upper-level ontologies, such as the IEEE Standard Upper Ontology, KIF, Sowa, Russel and Norvig and LADSEB (that can be considered a preliminary version of DOLCE [10]), one should refer to [3].…”
Section: Background: Ontological Categoriesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example it glues your smile to your face, or the charge in a specific conductor to the conductor itself. In our framework we adopt the so-called adopt non-migration principle [3]: it is not possible that an intrinsic moment m inheres in two different substances a and b. As a consequence, if we have two particular substances a (a red apple) and b (a red car), and two moments m 1 (particular redness of a) and m 2 (particular redness of b), we consider m 1 and m 2 to be different individuals, although perhaps qualitatively indistinguishable.…”
Section: Momentmentioning
confidence: 99%
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