1967
DOI: 10.2307/2214624
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Good Samaritans, Contrary-to-Duty Imperatives, and Epistemic Obligations

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Cited by 96 publications
(28 citation statements)
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“…Related Work Puzzles and paradoxes have accompanied deontic logic since its very beginning [30], starting with its formalisation in the so-called standard deontic logic (SDL). See von Wright's account [31] and McNamara's article [19] Problems in formalising CTDs in the original papers on deontic logic were first discussed by Chisholm in [8].Åqvist [2] gave a solution to the paradoxes related to CTDs (and also to the Good Samaritan and the paradox of the epistemic obligation) by proposing different semantic relations for primary and reparational obligations. The problem with the proposed solution is that one might need an unbounded (and eventually infinite) number of such relations in case of an unbounded number of nested CTDs.…”
Section: Final Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Related Work Puzzles and paradoxes have accompanied deontic logic since its very beginning [30], starting with its formalisation in the so-called standard deontic logic (SDL). See von Wright's account [31] and McNamara's article [19] Problems in formalising CTDs in the original papers on deontic logic were first discussed by Chisholm in [8].Åqvist [2] gave a solution to the paradoxes related to CTDs (and also to the Good Samaritan and the paradox of the epistemic obligation) by proposing different semantic relations for primary and reparational obligations. The problem with the proposed solution is that one might need an unbounded (and eventually infinite) number of such relations in case of an unbounded number of nested CTDs.…”
Section: Final Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The present section exposes a logic based on this view. 5 This logic will then be used to characterize the type of necessity involved in Anderson's reduction, thereby delivering a contextual version of it.…”
Section: A Modal Logic Of Contextmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We follow the presentation of the paradox given in [5]. Once "Smith robbing Jones" is represented by r and "Smith refraining from robbing Jones" by ¬r and, similarly, "Smith being punished" by p while "Smith not being punished" by ¬p, this set of ordinary language sentences-also called the Chisholm's set-can receive the following formalizations within SDL, which differ in the way they symbolize the conditional statements at points 3 and 4.…”
Section: An Ascriptive Glance At Chisholm's Paradoxmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For a discussion of contrary-to-duty obligations (or imperatives), see e.g. Carmo and Jones [14], which is an encyclopedic entry, as well as Chisholm [28], Åqvist [4], Hage [44], Carmo and Jones [13], Prakken and Sergot [91][92][93], and Governatori and Rotolo [42].…”
Section: Contrary-to-duty Obligations and Conflicting Normsmentioning
confidence: 99%