Gossip, Decision-making and Deterrence in Drug Markets

Dickinson, Timothy; Wright, Richard

doi:10.1093/bjc/azv010

Cited by 31 publications

(44 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…222-223) argue that violence "is not an invariant or inevitable feature of drug markets; many such markets experience little or no serious violence, and even the most violent drug markets are peaceful most of the time." Dickinson (2017) also provides similar evidence on the importance of avoiding violence in drug dealing settings, with firsthand examples of dealers practicing prevention by offering free drugs to clients so as to avoid snitching and eventual enforcement (see also Dickinson & Wright, 2015). Dickinson's dealers were more likely to threaten clients with avoidance than violence.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Conflict Management in Illicit Drug Cryptomarkets

Morselli

Décary‐Hétu

Paquet-Clouston

et al. 2017

International Criminal Justice Review

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Illegal drug markets have been described as 'stateless' systems. Drug dealers, moreover, are commonly considered to have a predilection toward the use of violence to resolve disputes arising from dealing activities. While some studies have undermined this popular perception, new trends surrounding the distribution of illegal drugs via online channels (drug cryptomarkets) have shifted the transactional setting from the physical to virtual realm, thus decreasing the likelihood of violent resolution outcomes even further. This article examines conflict management strategies within cryptomarkets by coding discussion forums between vendors and buyers. Violence, as expected, is absent. Strategies more likely reflect alternatives that have been recognized in conflict management research within and beyond illegal market settings: tolerance; avoidance; ostracism; third party intervention; monetary sanctions; negotiation; and threats. The overall setting from which such resolutions emerge is clearly not subject to formal regulations, but our analyses illustrate the multitude of informal social control mechanisms that are consistently at play and which underlie the selfregulatory and communal processes that are firmly in place.

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confidence: 99%

Conflict Management in Illicit Drug Cryptomarkets

Morselli

Décary‐Hétu

Paquet-Clouston

et al. 2017

International Criminal Justice Review

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“…Reasonably, one might expect to see repeat victimization if there was a long history of successful victimization of a singular location. It seems likely that news of a specific vulnerable target may spread, especially since economic criminals have reported working in groups (e.g., Copes & Vieraitis, 2012; Dickinson & Wright, 2015). However, based upon limited information within the FWPD data, it is difficult to extend these suppositions beyond conjecture, and therefore impossible to conclude that repeat economic crime incidents were more characteristic of flag or boost processes.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Near Repeat Examination of Economic Crimes

Powell

Grubb

Nobles

2018

Crime & Delinquency

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Criminological inquiry has recently showcased increased attention toward the near repeat phenomenon, which suggests that following an initial criminal event, there is an increased risk for the occurrence of the same type of event spatially and temporally proximate to the initiating event. The majority of previous research tends focuses on the patterns related to violent and conventional property crimes but neglects to examine other economic-related crimes. Given the significant costs associated with this crime type, unpacking hidden patterns may be useful in identifying high-risk areas and deploying appropriate countermeasures. The current study builds on previous examinations of the near repeat phenomenon through the exploration of specific economic crimes (counterfeiting, credit card/ATM fraud, false pretense/swindling) using 6 years of crime data from the Fort Worth (Texas) Police Department. Although near repeat patterns were discovered across multiple analyses, the greatest risk across all analyses was for repeat victimization at the same location. A discussion of policy implications, limitations, and areas for future research are also provided.

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“…Weak ties, acquaintanceships known to one but unknown to each other, are crucial in maintaining functioning networks and diffusing information. The low background noise of informational gossip is crucial for how criminals receive intelligence about market risks and law enforcement actions and adjust their behaviour (Dickinson and Wright 2015). My hypothesis is that this is true of cryptomarkets.…”

Section: Trade Associations Exist Alongside Cartelsmentioning

confidence: 96%

Cybercrime Is Not Always Rational, but It Is Reasonable

Bancroft

2019

The Darknet and Smarter Crime

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A challenge for researchers and law enforcement has been understanding criminal activities that are adaptive, resilient and well motivated but not 'organised' in a routine sense (Raab and Milward 2003). A powerful explanation examines their economic logic as sophisticated, rationally governed operations with business-like structures and functions that leverage adaptive network qualities (Kraemer-Mbula et al. 2013;Kshetri 2010;Yip et al. 2012). However, there tends to be an elision between 'markets' and 'economic rationality' as if the two are co-produced. Markets in neoclassical theory are theorised as pure rational exchange when they are in fact institutionalised, culturally located, socially embedded structures (Beckert 2009;Fligstein 2002). In order to function markets do not need rationality, in the sense of calculable judgements that respond to price/cost signals, and do not necessarily breed it either (Beckert and Dewey 2017).In terms of how we theorise illicit markets, criminology has increasingly recognised the many ways that dynamics of criminal economic entities are shaped by market relationships such as supply/demand relationships and economic opportunity structures (Becker 1968;Reuter 1983

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Gossip, Decision-making and Deterrence in Drug Markets

Cited by 31 publications

References 47 publications

Conflict Management in Illicit Drug Cryptomarkets

Conflict Management in Illicit Drug Cryptomarkets

A Near Repeat Examination of Economic Crimes

Cybercrime Is Not Always Rational, but It Is Reasonable

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