Governance, Local Politics and Districtization in Tanzania: The 1998 Arumeru Tax Revolt

Improving the conservation status of the Udzungwa Mountains, Tanzania? The effect of joint forest management on bushmeat hunting in the Kilombero nature reserve

“…Ensuring user cooperation requires transparency and accountability (Blair 2000;Petersen & Sandhövel 2001). Tanzanian local governments, however, have a record of poor governance plagued by corruption, coercion and violence (Kelsall 2000;Fjeldstad 2001;Brockington 2007). Where village councils and village natural resource councils (VNRCs) are distrusted, or bribes accepted, illegal activities may therefore continue (Akpalu et al 2009;Nielsen in review.).…”

Collectors, councillors and donors: Local government taxation and state-society relations in Tanzania

“…Other villages are only visited by collectors accompanied by the local militia. The well documented 1998 tax revolt in Arumero District in North-East Tanzania involved the refusal of almost the entire district population to pay the poll tax ('development levy'), the beating up of council collectors, the burning of the council chairman's house, and his subsequent resignation (Kelsall 2000).…”

Mass taxation and state–society relations in East Africa

“…The largest ethnic group, and the most likely candidate for special status, the Sukuma, live south and east of Lake Victoria, and comprise around 20% of the country's population. However, they have long been divided among dispersed chiefdoms and have never raised serious demands for local autonomy (Kelsall, 2000). There are more than 120 other ethnic groups, but they are relatively small and do not control the access to natural resources that may form the material basis for regional political power.…”

“…Hence, in 1962, the Native Authorities with their traditional rulers were abolished (Dryden 1968:117). The position of individual national leaders in the party and government at the central and regional levels were shaped by their education, administrative competence and, particularly, loyalty to the centre (Kelsall 2000). In addition to their official salaries, senior politicians and civil servants either ran or sat on the boards of parastatal enterprises and cooperatives, thereby securing substantial extra income for themselves.…”