Governing Civil Society: The Political Logic of NGO–State Relations Under Dictatorship

Abstract

This paper attempts to take the first steps toward developing a theory of non-governmental organizations (NGO)-state relations under dictatorship. Drawing on evidence from East Asia, the author argues that dictatorships typically employ one of two strategies in attempting to govern NGOs. First, some dictatorships follow a corporatist strategy, in which business associations, development, and social welfare organizations are co-opted into the state and controlled through a variety of strategies. Second, other dictatorships pursue an exclusionary strategy in which NGOs are marginalized and replaced with state institutions. Variation in the strategy chosen may be explained by differing levels of elite competition and the type of development strategy. Single-party states tend to regulate elite conflicts better and thus often choose corporatist strategies. In personalist regimes dictators tend to fear the organizational and mobilizational potential of NGOs and thus tend to pursue exclusionary strategies. This choice, however, is conditioned by the development strategy employed, as socialist development strategies reduce the incentives to allow NGOs.Résumé Cet article essaie de tracer les premières étapes vers le développement d'une théorie sur les relations ONG-état sous une dictature. Apportant des preuves de l'Asie de l'Est, l'auteur prétend que les dictatures utilisent typiquement une ou deux stratégies pour tenter de gouverner les ONG. Premièrement, certaines dictatures suivent une stratégie corporatiste, dans laquelle les associations d'affaires, les organisations de développement et d'assistance sociale sont intégrées dans l'état et contrôlées grâce à une variété d'artifices. Deuxièmement, d'autres dictatures poursuivent une stratégie d'exclusion dans laquelle les ONG sont marginalisées et remplacées par des institutions de l'état. Une variation de la stratégie

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“…During the immediate aftermath of the civil war, most of those organizations were abolished so that by 1965, only 100 remained at the national level and 6,000 at the local level. All were governmentdominated (Heurlin 2010;Chan 2005). The political control loosened after Deng Xiaoping's reforms of 1978 and organizations of various forms flourished.…”

“…Social welfare services are Voluntas typically provided by either local governments or state-owned enterprises, thus limiting the space in which social welfare NGOs could operate. Again, socialist development strategies emphasize the importance of state-led investment in rural development, thus reducing the scope for independent development NGOs in that key sector (Heurlin 2010). Similarly, the work units ('danwei') in cities and communes in rural areas operate as self-sufficient entities providing 'cradle-to-grave welfare,' again filling the space that NGOs often inhabit in capitalist states (Ma 2002a).…”

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