2001
DOI: 10.1080/714003892
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Governing Without Surviving? An Italian Paradox: Law-Making in Italy, 1987-2001

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Cited by 34 publications
(23 citation statements)
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“…However, after that, the government is largely free to pursue policies within the areas delegated. Capano and Giuliani (2001; document the extensive and increasing use of such delegations.…”
Section: Circumventing Tacticsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…However, after that, the government is largely free to pursue policies within the areas delegated. Capano and Giuliani (2001; document the extensive and increasing use of such delegations.…”
Section: Circumventing Tacticsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The "circumvention" part of the mixture refers to a variety of techniques that Italian governments have used to circumvent the ordinary statutory process. First, delegations of decree and rule-making authority to the executive have increased substantially (Capano and Giuliani 2001;. Such delegations avoid the statutory process entirely, except at the initial point of passing the delegating legislation.…”
Section: Agenda Setting In the Italian Chamber Of Deputiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…4 Therefore, in the new political setting of the second republic, the simple act of moving a bill has become a self-referential action in most cases. The success rate of governmental bills is certainly higher than private members' bills, but it is not at all clear whether present governments enjoy greater control of the legislative agenda than they did in the past (Capano & Giuliani 2001b;Newell 2006).…”
Section: Facts and Figuresmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, in a context of high fragmentation, the legislative behaviour of the parliamentary groups had often belied such simple conceptualisations. Most proposals that made it on to the statute book did so thanks to ample majorities drawn from across the governing/opposition divide (Capano and Giuliani, 2001;Newell, 2006); and there was no formal recognition in Parliament's standing orders of an official opposition. Now we had not only a governing majority staffed by just two groups, but a similar simplification among the ranks of the non-governing parties as well and the consequent emergence of a 'shadow cabinet' drawn from the largest of these parties.…”
Section: The More General Implications Of 2008mentioning
confidence: 99%