Objective The purpose of this study was to determine whether basic manual dexterity (BMD) could be an important parameter in selecting students for the Degree in Dentistry (CLOPD) and to assess whether initial manual dexterity in students admitted to the CLOPD can improve with training in pre-clinical and clinical practice. Design Observational study. Setting The study was carried out at the Catholic University of Rome, in five consecutive academic years. Subjects and methods Four hundred and thirty-three subjects (262 males and 171 females) were tested (10 different exercises) in fi ve consecutive years. Two retests were performed after three and five years respectively from the beginning of the experi mentation. Main outcome measures The scores of individual exercises were averaged for each candidate, assessing the mean value of basic manual dexterity score (BMDS). Results It was possible to observe some differences among candi dates coming from different types of high schools, since those having a prior university degree or a scientific high school degree proved better than those with classical or vocational high school qualifications (p < 0.05). A statistically signifi cant improvement of BMDS has been observed in students who attended the CLOPD for at least 32 months. Conclusions Data obtained revealed that basic manual dexterity is not essential in the selection of dental students. Students who could fol low training significantly improved in their manual ability.

This chapter addresses the issue of whether the domestic institutional architectures of the fifteen member states of the European Union (EU) affect the way in which they react to the challenges of European governance. More specifically, it empirically tests two different models in order to assess whether macro institutional features are systematically correlated with their degree of adaptation to the EU, using a data set from all fifteen EU states for the period 1986–2000. The first model tested is that of Lijphart (1999), who drew a distinction between consensual and majoritarian institutional architecture, and suggested that the EU displays the typical features of a consensual system; tests are run to determine whether the consensual model represents a favourable precondition for a member state’s adaptation to EU politics. The second model, that of Tsebelis (2002), turns around the concept of formal veto players (VPS); tests are run to determine whether the number of VPS affects the domestic process of Europeanization. The analysis demonstrates that domestic institutions influence the way in which national political systems relate themselves to the EU and adapt their normative framework to the process of Europeanization; a low number of veto points facilitates this process, by reducing the internal decision-making costs and favouring the flexibility and promptness of the policy-making system, but institutional isomorphism and consensual style do not facilitate the interaction between the national and the European level.

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The Great Recession is a non-trivial test bed for the theory of economic voting, especially if its predictions are decomposed at the party level, as done in this article by analysing the electoral performances of parties competing in 89 national elections held in the 28 member states of the EU between 2003 and 2015. We acknowledge counterintuitively that prime ministers’ parties are able to exploit the relatively good state of the economy, while sharing the blame with their allies in times of crisis, counting on the lack of clarity in the attribution of responsibilities and deploying their heresthetic capacities. We further recognize that new parties, more than opposition ones, proportionally profited from the recession. Tough times magnify the alternation between left- and right-wing victories, without necessarily favouring the most radical parties, whereas the EU’s supposed responsibility in prolonging the crisis fuelled the success of Eurosceptic parties.

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