The economic vote at the party level: Electoral behaviour during the Great Recession

Abstract

The Great Recession is a non-trivial test bed for the theory of economic voting, especially if its predictions are decomposed at the party level, as done in this article by analysing the electoral performances of parties competing in 89 national elections held in the 28 member states of the EU between 2003 and 2015. We acknowledge counterintuitively that prime ministers’ parties are able to exploit the relatively good state of the economy, while sharing the blame with their allies in times of crisis, counting on the lack of clarity in the attribution of responsibilities and deploying their heresthetic capacities. We further recognize that new parties, more than opposition ones, proportionally profited from the recession. Tough times magnify the alternation between left- and right-wing victories, without necessarily favouring the most radical parties, whereas the EU’s supposed responsibility in prolonging the crisis fuelled the success of Eurosceptic parties.

The costs of responsibility for the political establishment of the Eurozone (1999–2015)

“…In previous research, scholars have mostly analysed this relationship focusing on the case of Southern Europe, with some remarkable exceptions (Giuliani and Massari 2017). The existing explanations have centred, on the one hand, on the size and extent of electoral punishment for the incumbent parties, i.e.…”

“…In previous research, scholars have mostly analysed this relationship focusing on the case of Southern Europe, with some remarkable exceptions (Giuliani and Massari, 2017). The existing explanations have centred, on the one hand, on the size and extent of electoral punishment for the incumbent parties, that is, the ‘electoral epidemic’ (Bellucci, 2014; Bosco and Verney, 2012; Freire et al, 2014) and, on the other, on the difficulties for the formation and stability of governments, that is, the ‘government’ epidemic (Bosco and Verney, 2016).…”

Revisiting the politicization of the EU. A three-dimensional approach

“…This finding is relatively different from others, such as Hernandez and Kriesi (2016) who, using party electoral performance data before and after the crisis in 30 countries determined that prime ministers' parties are routinely damaged by the crisis, besides being harmed because they are in government. Giuliani and Massari (2017) also use aggregate data, namely the electoral performances of parties competing in 89 elections held in 28 eu member-states between 2003 and 2015. They find that all incumbent parties suffer similarly in the event of an economic crisis, while the pm's party gains comparatively more when there is economic growth.…”

Retrospective voting in the Italian 2013 election: a sub-national perspective

“…A further control variable is the change in turnout between the two elections. Citizens’ alienation during the Great Recession did not translate exclusively into voice against incumbents (Passarelli and Tuorto, 2014); it did so also into exit from the opportunity of be represented by parties (Giuliani and Massari, 2017). Thus, we need to add that confounding variable to our model.…”