Government Capacities and Policy Making by Decree in Latin America

Abstract

What is the effect of constitutional decree authority (CDA) on the policy-making process of a presidential regime? Despite recent efforts to answer this question, there is still much uncertainty in the literature about the extent to which decree powers may allow presidents to control the legislative process. This article argues that in a separation-of-powers system, the existence of CDA effectively enhances executives’ ability to act as agenda setters. This capacity, however, is not uniform across all cases. Developing a simple spatial model of decree games, the author argues that the bargaining power of an executive to promote legal changes through decrees varies according to three interrelated factors: decree approval rules, the extent of the executive’s partisan support in the legislature, and the strength of the presidential veto. These propositions are supported by a comparative analysis of the process of constitutional design and the implementation of decrees in Brazil and Argentina, two cases presenting significant variation in each of the independent variables.

Political Prowess or “Lady Luck”? Evaluating Chief Executives’ Legislative Success Rates

“…Of special interest is the capacity of chief executives to enact policy by winning legislative majorities for statutes. A very promising line of research on presidential ''lawmaking,'' and executive decree authority that centers on the conditions under which presidents resort to extraordinary (nonstatutory) rather than ordinary (statutory) means of legislative initiative has developed (Amorim Neto, Cox and McCubbins 2003;Negretto 2004;Pereira, Power, and Rennó 2005). However, it is striking how much remains unknown about the differential abilities of chief executive's to create statute law.…”

The Changing Role of Ministers in the Legislative Agenda in Brazil

“…Much is known about the functioning of governing coalitions within the legislature and the delineation of executive/legislative relations, especially in Latin America, and Brazil in particular (Figueiredo and Limongi, 1999;Ames, 2001;Amorim Neto, Cox and McCubbins, 2003;Pereira, Power and Renno, 2005;2007;Pereira and Mueller, 2002;Negretto, 2004;Aleman and Saiegh, 2007;Saiegh, 2010;Raile, Pereira and Power, 2011). Analysts regard pork and patronage as a central means of coalition management (Amorim Neto, Cox and McCubbins, 2003;Pereira, Power and Renno, 2005;Raile, Pereira and Power, 2011).…”

O Desempenho dos congressos Argentino e Brasileiro em perspectiva comparada

“…A decisão do Judiciário não previa a possibilidade de o Congresso rejeitar, de forma direta, o decreto. Se assim o desejasse, seria necessário que o Congresso aprovasse uma lei anulando a validade do decreto (Negretto, 2004) 24 .A exigência da aprovação de uma lei para revogar um decreto favorece a atuação presidencial, porque qualquer lei ordinária pode ser ve- De acordo com Negretto (idem) e Rubio e Goretti (1996), após a promulgação da reforma constitucional de 1994, uma lei deveria definir o trâmite legislativo dos DNUs, explicitando, por exemplo, se a derrubada do DNU deveria vir expressa em uma lei do Legislativo, e, neste caso, se o Executivo poderia vetá-la ou, ainda, se o projeto tramitaria simultaneamente nas duas Casas ou não.Tais questões estão pendentes até hoje, isto é, não se aprovou nenhuma norma definindo o trâmite legislativo dos DNUs, de forma que prevaleceu a decisão da Suprema Corte, em 1990, de aprovação táci-ta (Negretto, 2004 Sociais, vol. 44, nº 3, pp.…”

“…Tais questões estão pendentes até hoje, isto é, não se aprovou nenhuma norma definindo o trâmite legislativo dos DNUs, de forma que prevaleceu a decisão da Suprema Corte, em 1990, de aprovação táci-ta (Negretto, 2004 Sociais, vol. 44, nº 3, pp.…”

“…A decisão do Judiciário não previa a possibilidade de o Congresso rejeitar, de forma direta, o decreto. Se assim o desejasse, seria necessário que o Congresso aprovasse uma lei anulando a validade do decreto (Negretto, 2004) 24 .…”