Government eco‐innovation incentives in a recycling system: A Stackelberg‐type model

Abstract

As past economic progress has come at the expense of diminishing natural resources, increasing pollution and widespread damage to ecosystems around the world, an imperative we must respond to is to seek ways in which to achieve economic, social, and environmental sustainability, including actions aimed at a circular economy and eco‐innovation. Recycling has numerous implications for the environment, economic and production performance, employment, and production of wealth. The environmental regulator must therefore consider all the aspects of the waste cycle when deciding the right policies to maximize social welfare. We consider three types of agents involved in a Stackelberg game: manufacturers, importers and sellers (MIS), recyclers, and the government acting as an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In our model, we introduce the cost to adopt new technology for eco‐innovation per unit produced by the MIS, resulting in the possibility to reduce the weight of the advanced recycling fees if they invest more in the aptitude to be recycled of their products. The results give interesting prompts to investigate the relationship between environmental taxation and ecological incentives.

How Can Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling Public–Private Partnership Projects Performance Compensate during the Operation Period? A Two-Stage Perspective of Recycling and Remanufacturing

“…Through numerical analysis, this paper verifies that the government compensation policy can improve the two-stage performance of recycling and remanufacturing. The findings of Zhang et al [76] and Bimonte et al [77] also confirm that government compensation can improve performance. In addition, although Bimonte et al considered the environmental performance of CDW recycling, they did not realize that the process of recycling construction waste was staged.…”

Game Theory Applications to Socio-Environmental Studies, Development Economics, and Sustainability Research

“…The relevance of game theory for the analysis and optimization of the interaction between sizeable groups of states is palpable, especially within international environmental agreements such as the Paris Agreement or the European Green Deal [19,20]. Against this backdrop, the theory of global common-pool resource governance plays a central role in the assessment and optimization of international and global climate action.…”

Circular e‐waste ecosystems in necessity‐driven contexts: The impact of formal institutional voids

“…Given such complexity, a formal institutional environment that supports and steers actors to collaboratively engage in keeping resources at their highest value is paramount for the growth of a circular ecosystem (Fehrer et al, 2023; Konietzko et al, 2020; Susur & Engwall, 2023). Prior literature has, for example, highlighted the importance of regulations and public supportive measures (e.g., tax incentives), as well as formal agreements, certifications, and adequate market structures (e.g., Alonso‐Almeida et al, 2020; Bimonte et al, 2022; Blomsma et al, 2023; Droege et al, 2023; Fehrer et al, 2023; Konietzko et al, 2020; Parida et al, 2019; Zucchella & Previtali, 2019). Yet this body of work has, thus far, largely focused on high‐income economies; this is problematic, as findings might not be directly transferable to LMICs, for two main reasons.…”