In this article, we test Wagner’s assumption of the one-sided directional flow moving from economic growth to public spending in Italy for the 1951–2009 period. We pay particular attention to the impact of certain regime shifts related to changes in Italian budget regulations and procedures and the relevance of fiscal institutions to the fiscal performance equation, i.e. the public spending–national income nexus. The Error Correction Model is estimated to measure short-run dynamic effects and the long-run equilibrium between the two time series. The empirical evidence suggests that Wagner’s law is supported. In regard to policy implications, we find that public spending reacted less to positive changes in economic growth when the strengthening of the Ministry of Finance occurred in 1997 (Ciampi’s reform). Some sensitivity analyses confirm our empirical evidence

By employing a Granger causality methodology in a panel data framework, this article explores the relationship among efficiency, capitalization and credit risk within the local Italian banking system. Focusing the attention on cooperative banks, we specifically test whether managers take more risks in highly concentrated markets (i.e. monopoly) than in partially competitive markets (i.e. duopoly). The evidence shows that in more concentrated markets, management efficiency generates a decrease in risk-taking (rejecting the bad management hypothesis) with respect to the partially competitive markets. Results are consistent with the idea that banks with less local competition are able to increase their profits by indulging more freely in rent-seeking behaviour, minimizing their risk-taking and, consequently, improving the quality of their assets through additional screening processes. The financial crisis does not seem to affect the conduct of management in terms of bank investment decisions and risk-taking. A series of robustness tests generally confirms our findings

As past economic progress has come at the expense of diminishing natural resources, increasing pollution and widespread damage to ecosystems around the world, an imperative we must respond to is to seek ways in which to achieve economic, social, and environmental sustainability, including actions aimed at a circular economy and eco‐innovation. Recycling has numerous implications for the environment, economic and production performance, employment, and production of wealth. The environmental regulator must therefore consider all the aspects of the waste cycle when deciding the right policies to maximize social welfare. We consider three types of agents involved in a Stackelberg game: manufacturers, importers and sellers (MIS), recyclers, and the government acting as an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In our model, we introduce the cost to adopt new technology for eco‐innovation per unit produced by the MIS, resulting in the possibility to reduce the weight of the advanced recycling fees if they invest more in the aptitude to be recycled of their products. The results give interesting prompts to investigate the relationship between environmental taxation and ecological incentives.

The present paper provides theoretical insights regarding the determinants of firms’ incentives to invest in a Circular Economy. The analysis relies on a Cournot model disaggregating the disposal cost in the production function. In a non-simultaneous sequential game, two risk-neutral firms are endowed with a green innovation project that, if successful, would reduce the overall production costs and implement a Circular Economy. Firms are plagued by asymmetric information about the exact value of the other firm’s innovation. In this setting, the R&D investment in a Circular Economy, by affecting the distribution of production and disposal costs, influences the production decisions of both the innovating and the rival firms. The sign of the impact depends on the firms’ strategy in the product market. Furthermore, the analysis points out that cooperation in R&D of firms competing in the product market reinforces incentives to invest in green innovation. This suggests that governments aimed to advance a Circular Economy should encourage firms’ cooperation.

To exploit the tendency of students to get excited when they have to solve competitive games and introduce them to solve complex problems in real situations, the Departments of Mathematics and Economics of the University of Salerno devised a technological educational project, the Theory of Games Lab (GTL), for high school students. GTL helps students understand an abstract model that requires the use of mathematical analysis in economics, creating an engaging learning environment that improves their performance and rewards cooperative behavior. The choice of games is applied to the construction of a reward-based to engage in class discussions also using educational games sites. Technological artifacts are semiotic mediators in a constructivist approach. With a simulated role-playing game, students are landowners in medieval times and protect their lands by confronting the challenges and needs of other territories. At the end of the activities, the students have a better attitude for critical analysis of economic phenomena and are interested in issues never addressed before.