Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We are also grateful to an anonymous referee for several excellent comments. This paper was written while both authors were visiting the Department of Macro and Forecasting at DIW Berlin (2002)(2003)(2004). Hospitality from the Department of Macro Analysis and Forecasting at DIW is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies. Correspondence to: Chetan Ghate, Indian Statistical Institute -Delhi Center, 7 S.J.S Sansanwal Marg, New Delhi -110016, India. E-mail: cghate@isid.ac.in; Tel: 91-11-5166-1285; Fax:91-11-2685-6779 Abstract Can a growing welfare state induce a regime switch in the growth rate of an economy? This paper constructs a dynamic political economy model of economic growth and the welfare state in which both variables are non-linearly related and jointly endogenous. Using a Markov switching framework over the period 1950-2001, we find that the structural decline in growth rates that several welfare state economies experienced during [1970][1971][1972][1973][1974][1975] are preceded by movements to a high welfare state regime. This suggests that expanding welfare state regimes are associated with low economic growth regimes, while contracting welfare state regimes are associated with high growth regimes. However, we also find that the structural decline in growth rates leads to a downward structural break in the welfare state for many welfare state economies. This suggests that declining growth regimes are associated with contracting welfare state regimes, as lower growth forces politicians to cut the size of the welfare state. We also report strong evidence that both expansion and contractions in the welfare state affects growth non-linearly. These results are able to characterize a predictable and general pattern of welfare state-growth evolution.
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