Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies

Communication in multilateral bargaining

“…See http://www.cepr.net/err/nytimesarticles/call pork 11 29.htm 2 Theoretical extensions include (but are not limited to) Eraslan and Merlo (2002) who shows uniqueness of the stationary equilibrium; Banks and Duggan (2000) who generalize this model to multidimensional choice space; Diermeier and Merlo (2000) who study a dynamic model of government formation in Parliamentary democracies and Coate (2007, 2008) investigate the dynamic model of public spending; Diermeier and Feddersen (1998) who study cohesion in legislatures and the vote of confidence procedure; Tergiman (2013) who adds to that the possibility of offering a public good; Battaglini, Nunnari and Palfrey (2011) who study a version of the Baron-Ferejohn model in which the current decision becomes the status quo in the next period. 3 In most experiments, proposers do obtain higher shares than the coalition partners, but the difference is very far from what is predicted by the theory.…”

Legislative Bargaining and Incremental Budgeting

“…Indeed, the issue of incremental budgeting has attracted little analysis from a rational choice perspective. In particular, while there has been some recent literature on the impact of interest group lobbying on incremental budgetary outcomes (Tohamy, Aranson and Dezhbaksh, 1999;2000), 8 no previous attempt has been made 6 Wildavsky (1984, p. 14) examines appropriations for a sample of 37 agencies, and shows that the variation for the majority was less than 10% per year. See also Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky (1966) and Kamlet and Mowery (1987) for further evidence.…”

“…7 This idea could perhaps also be formulated in terms of the transaction costs of reaching a budgetary agreement. 8 Tohamy et al (1999;2000) develop an interest group approach, in which a single legislator (who is assumed to have unilateral control of budgetary policy) is lobbied by interest groups seeking budget allocations. The legislator can choose between 'single-period budgeting', allocating funds for one period only, or 'multi-period budgeting', allocating funding in perpetuity; the latter tends to lead to incremental outcomes.…”

A Political Winner’s Curse: Why Preventive Policies Pass Parliament so Narrowly

“…Downs 1957), between clearly defined parties in parliament (e.g. Diermeier and Merlo 2000), or between the parliament as a whole and other bodies of legislation (e.g. Matthews 1989).…”