We conduct an experiment in which subjects face the same questions repeated multiple times, with repetitions of two types: (1) following the literature, the repetitions are distant from each other; (2) in a novel treatment, the repetitions are in a row, and subjects are told that the questions will be repeated. We find that a large majority of subjects exhibit stochastic choice in both cases. We discuss the implications for models of stochastic choice.
We use laboratory experiments to test for one of the foundations of the rational voter paradigm -that voters respond to probabilities of being pivotal. We exploit a setup that entails stark theoretical effects of information concerning the preference distribution (as revealed through polls) on costly participation decisions. We find that voting propensity increases systematically with subjects' predictions of their preferred alternative's advantage. Consequently, pre-election polls do not exhibit the detrimental welfare effects that extant theoretical work predicts. They lead to more participation by the expected majority and generate more landslide elections.JEL classification: C92, D02, D72
There is growing evidence that not all experimental subjects understand their strategic environment. We introduce a ''choice process'' (CP) protocol that aids in identifying these subjects. This protocol elicits in an incentive compatible manner provisional choices as players internalize their decision making environment. We implement the CP protocol in the modified 2/3 guessing game and use it to pinpoint players that are naive by identifying those who make weakly dominated choices some time into the play. At all time horizons these players average close to 50. This is consistent with the assumption in Level-K theory that the least sophisticated subjects (the naive ones) play uniformly over the [1-100] action space. In contrast, sophisticated players show evidence of increased understanding as time passes. We find that the CP protocol mirrors play in multiple setups with distinct time constraints. Hence it may be worth deploying more broadly to understand the interaction between decision time and choice.Keywords Experiment Á 2/3 Guessing game Á Level 0 playElectronic supplementary material The online version of this article
In this paper we use a laboratory setting to manipulate our subjects' beliefs about the cognitive levels of the players they are playing against. We show that in the context of the 2/3 guessing game, individuals' choices do not always reflect their full cognitive abilities, but rather are a reflection of their full cognitive abilities and their beliefs on others' abilities. Hence, a subject's true cognitive level may be greater than the one he exhibits in a game with the difference being attributed to his expectations about the sophistication of the players he is matched with.JEL Codes: C72, C92, D83.
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