The article examines the dynamics of political competition over the control of the executive that shapes the coexistence of popularly elected presidents and prime ministers in semi-presidential regimes. It explores how variation in the political status of cabinet and the character of the party system, as well as differences in presidential and parliamentary powers over the cabinet, affects both the type and intensity of intra-executive conflict in democratic and semi-democratic environments. It demonstrates that presidents' and prime ministers' strategies in intra-executive relations in both types of political environment are systematically affected by the nature and extent of cabinet's political support in parliament, as well as by the degree of presidential control over cabinet.The post-communist transition led to the proliferation of semi-presidential regimes in East Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union.The coexistence of popularly elected presidents and prime ministers, which is a distinct feature of a semi-presidential constitutional framework, and which is often labeled as 'intra-executive' coexistence, has proven to be prone to conflict in most of these regimes. Among the factors leading to conflict, scholars often cite personality, ideological differences magnified by certain party system configurations, newness of institutional designs and constitutional ambiguities (Baylis, 1996;Elgie, 1999a;Taras, 1997).Very few attempts, however, have been made to arrive at some comparative framework for analyzing intra-executive conflict.This article examines the systematic effects that variations in presidential and parliamentary powers over cabinet, in political composition of parliament and in the political status of cabinet have on the probability of intra-executive conflict in semi-presidential regimes. Intra-executive conflict, which is defined as political confrontation between president and prime minister over the control of the executive branch of government, is first put into the framework of institutional relationships among the president, parliament and cabinet. I argue that conceptualizing this relationship in terms of a multiple principal-agent model enhances our understanding of how semi-presidentialism works.Secondly, I discuss how the political status of cabinet, which is determined by the character of parliamentary composition and the level of party system development, affects the set of incentives that prime ministers face in a semi-