GPS Signal Authentication From Cooperative Peers

Heng, Liang; Work, Daniel B.; Gao, Grace Xingxin

doi:10.1109/tits.2014.2372000

Cited by 73 publications

(47 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Other works in literature have studied the use of multiple receivers to detect GPS spoofing attacks such as in [22]- [24]. In [22], the authors demonstrated the ability of using a dual antenna receiver in detecting GPS spoofing attacks.…”

Section: Arxiv:190411568v3 [Cssy] 29 Dec 2019mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, under a GPS spoofing attack, the measured distances will be very close to zero, as all the receivers are spoofed with the same fake location. Finally, in [24], multiple receivers were used to authenticate the GPS signals based on the correlation with the military GPS signal, without the need to decrypt it. Among these receivers, one GPS receiver uses the other receivers, referred to as cross-check receivers, to determine whether its GPS signals are authentic.…”

Section: Arxiv:190411568v3 [Cssy] 29 Dec 2019mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Drones in Distress: A Game-Theoretic Countermeasure for Protecting UAVs Against GPS Spoofing

Eldosouky

Ferdowsi

Saad

2020

IEEE Internet Things J.

113

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One prominent security threat that targets unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is the capture via GPS spoofing in which an attacker manipulates a UAV's global positioning system (GPS) signals in order to capture it. Given the anticipated widespread deployment of UAVs for various purposes, it is imperative to develop new security solutions against such attacks. In this paper, a mathematical framework is introduced for analyzing and mitigating the effects of GPS spoofing attacks on UAVs. In particular, system dynamics are used to model the optimal routes that the UAVs will adopt to reach their destinations. The GPS spoofer's effect on each UAV's route is also captured by the model. To this end, the spoofer's optimal imposed locations on the UAVs, are analytically derived; allowing the UAVs to predict their traveling routes under attack. Then, a countermeasure mechanism is developed to mitigate the effect of the GPS spoofing attack. The countermeasure is built on the premise of cooperative localization, in which a UAV can determine its location using nearby UAVs instead of the possibly compromised GPS locations. To better utilize the proposed defense mechanism, a dynamic Stackelberg game is formulated to model the interactions between a GPS spoofer and a drone operator. In particular, the drone operator acts as the leader that determines its optimal strategy in light of the spoofer's expected response strategy. The equilibrium strategies of the game are then analytically characterized and studied through a novel proposed algorithm. Simulation results show that, when combined with the Stackelberg strategies, the proposed defense mechanism will outperform baseline strategy selection techniques in terms of reducing the possibility of UAV capture.

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Section: Arxiv:190411568v3 [Cssy] 29 Dec 2019mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Arxiv:190411568v3 [Cssy] 29 Dec 2019mentioning

confidence: 99%

Drones in Distress: A Game-Theoretic Countermeasure for Protecting UAVs Against GPS Spoofing

Eldosouky

Ferdowsi

Saad

2020

IEEE Internet Things J.

113

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Subsequent risk is related to location-related attacks. The GPS signal could be vulnerable to position lock (jamming) or to feeding the receiver with false information, so that it computes an erroneous time or location (spoofing) [190,191]. Similar techniques may be applied to cellular-and WLAN-based location services [192,193].…”

Section: Security and Privacymentioning

confidence: 99%

Multi-Factor Authentication: A Survey

et al. 2018

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Today, digitalization decisively penetrates all the sides of the modern society. One of the key enablers to maintain this process secure is authentication. It covers many different areas of a hyper-connected world, including online payments, communications, access right management, etc. This work sheds light on the evolution of authentication systems towards Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) starting from Single-Factor Authentication (SFA) and through Two-Factor Authentication (2FA). Particularly, MFA is expected to be utilized for human-to-everything interactions by enabling fast, user-friendly, and reliable authentication when accessing a service. This paper surveys the already available and emerging sensors (factor providers) that allow for authenticating a user with the system directly or by involving the cloud. The corresponding challenges from the user as well as the service provider perspective are also reviewed. The MFA system based on reversed Lagrange polynomial within Shamir's Secret Sharing (SSS) scheme is further proposed to enable more flexible authentication. This solution covers the cases of authenticating the user even if some of the factors are mismatched or absent. Our framework allows for qualifying the missing factors by authenticating the user without disclosing sensitive biometric data to the verification entity. Finally, a vision of the future trends in MFA is discussed.

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“…The open GNSS signal does not inherently carry any ''built-in'' anti-interference method; therefore, it is vulnerable to radio-frequency attacks that aim either at blinding the receiver or fooling it. The first condition is typically indicated as jamming, as in the case of Grant et al (2009), while the second is known as spoofing (Heng et al 2015).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The major hazard in this situation is that the receiver is typically not aware of being fooled; therefore, it does not raise any alarm to the hosting system, which is induced to make wrong and possibly hazardous decisions based on spoofed PNT information. The recent literature has highlighted the risk of intentional attackers willing to interfere with the correct GNSS receiver functions (Heng et al 2015;Akos 2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hypothesis testing methods to detect spoofing attacks: a test against the TEXBAT datasets

et al. 2016

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The hazardous effects of spoofing attacks on the global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receiver are well known. Technologies and algorithms to increase the awareness of GNSS receivers against such attacks become more important and necessary. We present the validation of two statistical spoofing detection methods, namely the Chisquare goodness of fit (GoF) test and the Sign test applied to pairwise correlator differences, for each satellite tracked by the receiver. The test bench for the algorithms, both implemented in a software receiver, is the public database produced by the University of Texas at Austin, which reproduces various representative cases of spoofing attacks (the so-called TEXBAT). The algorithms show a very promising capability of detecting the attack, in particular when an aggregate decision is taken based on a joint detection upon all the tracked satellites. Furthermore, the GoF test appears also reliable in dynamic conditions and in case of a huge power advantage of the spoofing signal. The response of the receiver to the attacks confirms the spoofing signal represents an ''extraneous agent'' which, before taking control of the receiver, can be recognized by properly combined strategies of signal quality monitoring.

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GPS Signal Authentication From Cooperative Peers

Abstract: Grace Xingxin Gao (M'12) received the B.S. degree in mechanical engineering and the M.S. degree in electrical engineering

Cited by 73 publications

References 20 publications

Drones in Distress: A Game-Theoretic Countermeasure for Protecting UAVs Against GPS Spoofing

Drones in Distress: A Game-Theoretic Countermeasure for Protecting UAVs Against GPS Spoofing

Multi-Factor Authentication: A Survey

Hypothesis testing methods to detect spoofing attacks: a test against the TEXBAT datasets

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