2008
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-008-9044-3
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Gradualism and uncertainty in international union formation: The European Community’s first enlargement

Abstract: This paper introduces a new theoretical framework of international unions qua coalitions of countries adopting a common policy and common supranational institutions. I make use of a three-country spatial bargaining game of coalition formation, in order to examine the endogenous strategic considerations in the creation and enlargement of international unions. Why would we observe a gradualist approach in the formation of the grand coalition even if the latter is assumed to be weakly efficient? I propose asymmet… Show more

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Cited by 17 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…Distributional conflict surrounds constraints on agent autonomy, so the European principal–agent problem has dimensions that Pollack (1997) fails to acknowledge. Indeed, an important theme in the history of European integration are pervasive disagreements between major member states, such as Germany and Great Britain, on how centralized the union should be (Konstantinidis 2008; Slapin 2009).…”
Section: Designing International Delegationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Distributional conflict surrounds constraints on agent autonomy, so the European principal–agent problem has dimensions that Pollack (1997) fails to acknowledge. Indeed, an important theme in the history of European integration are pervasive disagreements between major member states, such as Germany and Great Britain, on how centralized the union should be (Konstantinidis 2008; Slapin 2009).…”
Section: Designing International Delegationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While many scholars have argued that gradualism can result from dynamic 'preference transformation' or 'identity change,' these constructivist processes have not been rigorously modeled (Chayes and Chayes, 1995;Downs, 2000;Osgood, 1962;Wendt, 1994). While political economists mostly emphasize informational or monitoring issues (Dai, 2002;Urpelainen, 2009), the present analysis provides a new dynamic enforcement rationale (Konstantinidis, 2008;Langlois and Langlois, 2001). My paper is not the first to explain gradualism, but it provides a new strategic explanation.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 75%
“…The European Commission and the European Parliament now interfere extensively with member state sovereignty (Pollack, 1997). The membership and scope of the union have expanded while international cooperation has grown deeper in many issue areas (Downs et al, 1998;Konstantinidis, 2008). Other essential multilateral regimes that have evolved gradually are the multilateral trade regime and the international climate regime (Aldy and Stavins, 2007;Hudec, 1993).…”
Section: Examplesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…One solution is to insist on deep international cooperation -despite major distributional implications -but compensate the losers up front (Carrubba 1997;Alesina, Angeloni, and Etro 2005;Barberà and Jackson 2006;Konstantinidis 2008). One solution is to insist on deep international cooperation -despite major distributional implications -but compensate the losers up front (Carrubba 1997;Alesina, Angeloni, and Etro 2005;Barberà and Jackson 2006;Konstantinidis 2008).…”
Section: International Cooperation and Uncertainty About Ex Post Outsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…If states expect international cooperation to carry distributional implications, how can the anticipated losers be enticed to participate? One solution is to insist on deep international cooperation – despite major distributional implications – but compensate the losers up front (Carrubba 1997; Alesina, Angeloni, and Etro 2005; Barberà and Jackson 2006; Konstantinidis 2008). For example, powerful states could offer foreign aid to weak states in exchange for economic reform that allows the expansion of international business.…”
Section: International Cooperation and Uncertainty About Ex Post Outsmentioning
confidence: 99%