Grand Coalitions and Democratic Dysfunction: Two Warnings from Central Europe

Abstract

Are 'grand coalitions' -coalitions that include the two largest parties in a parliamentary system -good or bad for democracy? This article analyses that question in light of the recent rise of populist parties that large mainstream parties may try to exclude from government by forming grand coalitions with other large mainstream parties. I call this the 'sterilization' logic and note that mainstream parties' ability to do this varies widely. Where parties have previously used grand coalitions primarily according to a 'clientelistic' logic -for example, Austriamainstream parties may well be unable to rally the party system against insurgent populist challengers. Where mainstream parties have used grand coalitions exceptionally and for major institutional 'renovations' -for example, Germany -the grand coalition remains a viable option for responding to insurgent challenges, though this strategy is also quite risky. This article considers the implications for democracy by tracing recent developments in the context of the euro crisis and the European refugee situation. The major empirical referents are Austria and Germany -two countries with extensive experience and literature about grand coalitions -but the article draws out the implications of the analysis for other European parliamentary contexts.

Merkel's Germany and the European Union: Between Emergency and the Rule of Rules

“…The giant is very much awake now, even in Germany. If populism is a disease, to paraphrase Wade Jacoby (2017: 349), then the lesson from Germany is that a ‘surplus of consensus’ is a risky cure.…”

“…By doing so, paradoxically, they strengthen the attractiveness of radical parties, which can then claim truly to represent alternative perspectives ignored by the mainstream. Hence, one of the key questions for contemporary Germany is ‘whether the purported cure of a GC is sometimes worse than the populist challenge’ it seeks to check (Jacoby 2017: 330) 1…”

New Parties, Fractionalization, and the Increasing Duration of Government Formation Processes in the EU Member States

“…However, the previous argument does not consider the fact that the reduced number of viable government coalitions would mostly include “unholy alliances” with long‐term mainstream rivals. And the existing literature demonstrates how grand coalitions require long bargaining processes (Jacoby 2017, 331). That is why we consider Ecker and Meyer's last distinction as not relevant to our research and we prefer to reason around the entire government formation process.…”

Where is the middle? Considering the socio-political centre in Germany

“…A long post-election delay in the formation of a new government led commentators to evoke a constitutional crisis and to intervention by the President (Bundespräsidialamt, 2017). Exclusion of a 'far-right' party from government was sustained as a raison d'état, or 'sterilisation' (Jacoby, 2017), when rejection of another grand coalition was among the factors that had propelled the AfD's rise. Eventually the same parties reproduced themselves as incumbents (see Pellegata & Quaranta, 2019, p. 433) after together losing almost 3.5 million votes and continuing a decline from 80 to 90 per cent in the period 1960-1980 to 53 per cent in 2017.…”