Green Product Supply Chain Coordination Under Demand Uncertainty

Xin, Chong; Chen, Xin; Chen, Haifeng; Chen, Shuangrui; Zhang, Meiqi

doi:10.1109/access.2020.2963944

Cited by 21 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…Fang et al [28] investigated price and order strategies for innovative green products using demand forecasting and sharing. Xin et al [29] studied the problem of coordinating two levels of green product supply chains in the presence of uncertain demand from environmentally conscious consumers and found that two-part tariff contracts can always coordinate the supply chain. Zhang et al [30] found that if manufacturers distributed brown and green products separately through different retailers, they could achieve higher profits through strategic pricing without changing their product portfolios.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Government Regulations and Consumer Behavior Influence Manufacturers’ Product Green Degree Decision‐Making: An Agent‐Based Model

Yuan

Dong

Jia

et al. 2021

Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing

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In recent years, green product issues have received increasing attention. Both government regulations and consumer behaviors have a strong influence on the product green degree decisions of manufacturers’ products. In order to find how government regulations and individual’s green product purchase behavior affect manufacturers’ green degree decisions and the market evolution characteristics, this paper proposes a multiagent model that considers the interaction among government, consumers, and manufacturers. The simulation results show that, firstly, the product green degree decision-making of manufacturers needs the guidance and regulation of the government. Secondly, product price subsidies are the most effective way to affect the manufacturers’ product green degree decisions. In contrast to giving green cost subsidies to manufacturers, the government employs various publicity means to improve the environmental awareness of consumers is also an effective way to enhance the green degree of manufacturers’ products. Thirdly, there is a “Crowding Out Effect” on the other qualities of manufacturers’ products when manufacturers focus on the green degree of their products.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Government Regulations and Consumer Behavior Influence Manufacturers’ Product Green Degree Decision‐Making: An Agent‐Based Model

Yuan

Dong

Jia

et al. 2021

Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…However, all the research concentrates on the reverse channel in this paper, and the fairness concern of collectors has no impact on retailers. When the manufacturer considers the Corporate Social Responsibility(CSR) of the channel and the sustainable development of the enterprise, he will increase the advertising investment [47], green product promotion [48] and so on to change the reputation of the CLSC. At this time, the reputation of the CLSC will change with the CSR level of the manufacturer, which will definitely have a certain effect on the forward channel.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing Decisions in Closed-Loop Supply Chains With Multiple Fairness-Concerned Collectors

Shu

Ding

2020

IEEE Access

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In the same model, both distributional fairness concern and peer-induced fairness concern are considered, so are the absolute fairness concern and the relative fairness concern. When there are multiple recycling markets, collectors attach importance not only to the fairness distribution of profit with the manufacturer (distributional fairness concern), but also to the fairness distribution of profit with the peer collector (peer-induced fairness concern). On the basis of the perspective of the collectors, this paper introduces distributional and peer-induced fairness concern into the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). The impact of the collectors' different fairness concerns on the CLSC pricing decisions is discussed under five models.The research shows that: (1) When the manufacturer considers the collectors' fairness concern, the manufacturer's profit and distributional fairness concern coefficient change inversely, and the collectors' profit and distributional fairness concern coefficient move together, that is, the distributional fairness concern is of advantage to the collectors but not good for the manufacturer. On the contrary, the manufacturer's profit and peer-induced fairness concern coefficient move in the same direction, while the profit of the collectors and peer-induced fairness concern coefficient change in opposite direction; (2) As long as the manufacturer considers the fairness of the collectors, the profit of the collector who pays attention to both fairness is always lower than that of the collector who only concerns distributional fairness, so peer-induced fairness concern is not a self-interest behavior. However, when the appeal of the two collectors for fairness distribution is not considered by the manufacturer, peer-induced fairness concern benefits himself; (3) The two-part Tariff contract has realized the coordination of the CLSC. Additionally, our findings provide some managerial insights on the pricing decision when the collectors consider multiple fairness concerns. INDEX TERMS closed-loop supply chain, distributional fairness concern, peer-induced fairness concern, absolute fairness concern, relative fairness concern, two-part Tariff contract.

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“…From the perspective of manufacturers, Nielsen proposes a sequential profit-sharing mechanism under the constraint of wholesalers, which will enable manufacturers to produce products at the highest green level to move towards sustainable development [16]. Xin explored the harmonization problem of green production with uncertain demand, illustrating the validity of contract with uncertain demand [17].…”

Section: A Green Supply Chain Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing and Financing Strategies for a Green Supply Chain With a Risk-Averse Supplier

Kang

Gao

et al. 2021

IEEE Access

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This study investigated a green supply chain comprising a single supplier with financial constraints and a single retailer, while also considering the supplier's degree of risk aversion. A supplierretailer Stackelberg game model was established under different financing situations, namely, bank financing and retailer's advance payment, and optimal decisions were derived for both the supplier and the retailer. The analysis examined the influence of the degree of the supplier's risk aversion, pricing and financing strategies on optimal decisions. The results show that high supplier risk aversion is not conducive to the supply chain green development. When the supplier has less initial capital, the strategy of advance payment provided by the retailer will be prioritized within the supplier's financial constraints. When the supplier's initial capital is more, he should use the initial capital for production. The study's consideration of the supply chain green level as an endogenous variable, as well as of the supplier's risk aversion, contributes to its novelty.

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Green Product Supply Chain Coordination Under Demand Uncertainty

Cited by 21 publications

References 37 publications

How Government Regulations and Consumer Behavior Influence Manufacturers’ Product Green Degree Decision‐Making: An Agent‐Based Model

How Government Regulations and Consumer Behavior Influence Manufacturers’ Product Green Degree Decision‐Making: An Agent‐Based Model

Pricing Decisions in Closed-Loop Supply Chains With Multiple Fairness-Concerned Collectors

Pricing and Financing Strategies for a Green Supply Chain With a Risk-Averse Supplier

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