Gricean Communication and Cognitive Development

Moore, Richard

doi:10.1093/pq/pqw049

Cited by 50 publications

(85 citation statements)

References 55 publications

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“…Some workers in primate cognition have therefore argued that, if standard interpretations of Grice are right, then Gricean communication would be too difficult for both animals and human children. If this is correct, then standard interpretations must overstate the cognitive pre‐requisites of Gricean communication (Gómez, ; Moore, (in press), , ) – and human and animal communication may share a common psychological framework after all. The less‐intellectualised approaches to human communication are supported by the argument that even in adults, speech production and interpretation seems not always to require inference computation or belief ascription about speaker intentions (Millikan, ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

ExorcisingGrice's ghost: an empirical approach to studying intentional communication in animals

et al. 2016

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International audienceLanguage's intentional nature has been highlighted as a crucial feature distinguishing it from other communication systems. Specifically, language is often thought to depend on highly structured intentional action and mutual mindreading by a communicator and recipient. Whilst similar abilities in animals can shed light on the evolution of intentionality, they remain challenging to detect unambiguously. We revisit animal intentional communication and suggest that progress in identifying analogous capacities has been complicated by (i) the assumption that intentional (that is, voluntary) production of communicative acts requires mental-state attribution, and (ii) variation in approaches investigating communication across sensory modalities. To move forward, we argue that a framework fusing research across modalities and species is required. We structure intentional communication into a series of requirements, each of which can be operationalised, investigated empirically, and must be met for purposive, intentionally communicative acts to be demonstrated. Our unified approach helps elucidate the distribution of animal intentional communication and subsequently serves to clarify what is meant by attributions of intentional communication in animals and humans

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

ExorcisingGrice's ghost: an empirical approach to studying intentional communication in animals

et al. 2016

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“…Children can enter the world of communication by acting rationally in light of previous social interactions and expecting others to do the same. Together with accounts about the intentional structure of human communication , our argument emphasizes the social and interactional nature of human communication while making fewer demands on the cognitive abilities involved, thereby offering a truly developmental perspective.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Common Ground and Development

Bohn

Köymen

2017

Child Dev Perspectives

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Language and other forms of communication are inherently ambiguous and therefore require some form of common ground to specify the intended meanings of utterances. Theoretical accounts usually focus on interactions between adults and consider recursive mindreading a prerequisite to establishing common ground. Contrasting these accounts, in this article, we offer a developmental perspective on common ground. We propose that instead of using recursive mindreading, infants rely initially on the expectation that communicative partners act rationally in light of previous interactions, which serves as a starting point for common ground to develop. We describe the changing role of common ground across development. Initially, common ground constrains the meaning of ambiguous communicative acts and facilitates children's acquisition of language. Later in development, common ground makes communication efficient by helping speakers coordinate their actions and intentions, and eventually arrive at recursive mindreading.

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“…A standard requirement for intentional communication is Grice's (1957) conditions for non-natural meaning (taken from Moore, 2015, with reference to Neale, 1992andSperber &Wilson (1986/1995):…”

Section: Can a Teleologist Communicate Intentionally?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In response to strong mentalistic claims that grasping communicative intent requires entertaining something as complex as a fourth order meta-representation (Sperber, 2000), some authors argue for less complexity (Breheny, 2006;Moore, 2015). As an example, Moore (2015) refers to the situation of one person (Speaker) pointing to the ground to indicate to her partner (Hearer) that there may be tubers under the ground, for which they could dig.…”

Section: Can a Teleologist Communicate Intentionally?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As an example, Moore (2015) refers to the situation of one person (Speaker) pointing to the ground to indicate to her partner (Hearer) that there may be tubers under the ground, for which they could dig. Moore points out that following Grice's definition; S need not represent to herself that she intends to inform H about her request.…”

Section: Can a Teleologist Communicate Intentionally?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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