Group activity selection problem with approval preferences

Darmann, Andreas; Elkind, Edith; Kurz, Sascha; Lang, Jérôme; Schauer, Joachim; Woeginger, Gerhard J.

doi:10.1007/s00182-017-0596-4

Cited by 22 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…7. The anonymous encoding (Ballester, 2004;Darmann et al, 2018): Each agent specifies only a preference relation over the number of agents in her coalition (ignoring who they are). 8.…”

Section: Representing Preferences Over Coalitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hedonic Games with Ordinal Preferences and Thresholds

Kerkmann¹,

Lang²,

Rey³

et al. 2020

jair

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We propose a new representation setting for hedonic games, where each agent partitions the set of other agents into friends, enemies, and neutral agents, with friends and enemies being ranked. Under the assumption that preferences are monotonic (respectively, antimonotonic) with respect to the addition of friends (respectively, enemies), we propose a bipolar extension of the responsive extension principle, and use this principle to derive the (partial) preferences of agents over coalitions. Then, for a number of solution concepts, we characterize partitions that necessarily or possibly satisfy them, and we study the related problems in terms of their complexity.

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“…7. The anonymous encoding (Ballester, 2004;Darmann et al, 2018): Each agent specifies only a preference relation over the number of agents in her coalition (ignoring who they are). 8.…”

Section: Representing Preferences Over Coalitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hedonic Games with Ordinal Preferences and Thresholds

Kerkmann¹,

Lang²,

Rey³

et al. 2020

jair

Self Cite

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“…We begin with the model considered in this work and some basic definitions (see also Darmann 2018, Darmann et al 2018, and the survey by Darmann and Lang 2017).…”

Section: Formal Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We investigate the aspect of strategic manipulability in a group activity selection problem considered in Darmann et al (2018) and Darmann (2018) respectively. In this setting, there is a set of agents and a set of activities to which the agents should be assigned, where each agent can take part in at most one activity.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In natural, special preference domains we analyze the strategyproofness of the respective single-valued aggregation functions and possibly multi-valued aggregation correspondences with respect to the number of activities involved. Darmann et al (2018) introduce the general group activity selection problem GASP, where the agents' preferences are weak orders over the pairs "(activity, group size)". There, the problems of finding a stable assignment, for stability notions such as Nash and core stability, and, above all, finding a maximum individually rational assignment-that is an assignment maximizing the number of agents assigned to a non-void activity in an individually rational assignment-are studied from a computational viewpoint in the approval-based variant a-GASP.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There, the problems of finding a stable assignment, for stability notions such as Nash and core stability, and, above all, finding a maximum individually rational assignment-that is an assignment maximizing the number of agents assigned to a non-void activity in an individually rational assignment-are studied from a computational viewpoint in the approval-based variant a-GASP. Darmann (2018) considers the problem of finding Pareto optimal and stable solutions in the strict preference setting of o-GASP, for different stability notions including the one of core stability. In both works the focus is laid on the special cases of increasing and decreasing preferences.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Manipulability in a group activity selection problem

Darmann

2018

Soc Choice Welf

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We consider the aspect of strategic manipulation in a group activity selection problem. Given a set of activities in which they might participate, the agents have preferences over the activities themselves and over the number of participants in the activities; the goal is to assign agents to activities on basis of their preferences. In this paper, we consider the possibility of strategic manipulation involved in providing solutions in such a setting, for the solution concepts of maximum individual rationality, core stability, and Pareto optimality respectively. For three different preference extensions (Gärdenfors extension, maxi-min extension and maxi-max extension) we analyze strategic manipulability with respect to the number of activities available. In general, the considered solution concepts turn out to be prone to strategic manipulation; in some natural special cases, however, strategyproofness is provided by such an aggregation.

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Democratic Forking: Choosing Sides with Social Choice

Abramowitz

Elkind

Grossi

et al. 2021

Algorithmic Decision Theory

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Group activity selection problem with approval preferences

Cited by 22 publications

References 17 publications

Hedonic Games with Ordinal Preferences and Thresholds

Hedonic Games with Ordinal Preferences and Thresholds

Manipulability in a group activity selection problem

Democratic Forking: Choosing Sides with Social Choice

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