Group decision and social interaction: A theory of social decision schemes.

Abstract

This paper proposes a general theory (social decision scheme theory) for many kinds of group decision making and illustrates some special case models with a variety of data from several experimental situations. While focusing upon the traditional issue of individual-group differences, the theory is aimed at accounting for the distribution of group decisions by using formal hypotheses about the effects of social interaction when the inputs to discussion are individual member preferences. The basic assumptions underlying the model are similar in several respects to proposals by Davis (1962) andSteiner (1966) in group problem-solving research, and the model itself represents the general case of earlier theoretical notions by Smoke and Zajonc (1962), Davis, Hoppe andHornseth (1968), and in group decision making. In addition, several nonintuitive consequences of group decision making, assuming some form of the model, are discussed.

Information Sampling, Belief Synchronization, and Collective Illusions

“…An important reason for why this often happens is social choice, such as majority voting. When groups select alternatives by using majority voting (Davis 1973;Hastie & Kameda, 2005;Stasser, Kerr & Davis, 1980), every member will be exposed to the more popular alternative, even those who were in favor of another alternative. Our theory predicts that such social choice rule will contribute to an homogenization of opinions.…”

Groups outperform individuals in tacit coordination by using consensual and disjunctive salience

“…The likelihood of the group containing at least one advocate of the "truth" increases as the number of members increases. The consensual salience process is akin to a majority-plurality process in social decision scheme theory (see Stasser, 1999;Davis, 1973). Consider, for example, a majority model that gives the benefit of ties to the focal point.…”

“…We hypothesize that if an option is initially preferred by a majority of group members, it will be selected as the group's decision. In terms of social decision schemes, this process would yield a "majority-wins" scheme (Davis, 1973;Laughlin, 1999;Stasser, 1999). Such a pattern would echo classic findings on majority influence and attitude polarization in small groups (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969;Myers & Lamm, 1976).…”

“…Just as when a group of friends is searching for the last puzzle piece that seems to have been lost in the house, the group succeeds if any single member succeeds. In terms of social decision schemes, the proposed process is captured by a "truth-wins" scheme (Davis, 1973;Laughlin, 1999;Stasser, 1999).…”

Cognitive Biases Affect the Acceptance of Tradeoff Studies

“…However, there is no clear or general pattern. Complicated social models such as Davis's social decision scheme [10] give good, albeit complicated answers. In short, cognitive problems in decision making cannot always be solved by requiring group decision making.…”