Conflicts between individual and collective interests are ubiquitous in social life. Experimental studies have investigated the resolution of such conflicts using public goods games with either continuous or step-level payoff functions. Game theory and social interdependence theory identify consequential differences between these two types of games. Continuous function games are prime examples of social dilemmas because they always contain a conflict between individual and collective interests, whereas step-level games can be construed as social coordination games. Step-level games often provide opportunities for coordinated solutions that benefit both the collective and the individuals. For this and other reasons, the authors conclude that one cannot safely generalize results obtained from step-level to continuous-form games (or vice versa). Finally, the authors identify specific characteristics of the payoff function in public goods games that conceptually mark the transition from a pure dilemma to a coordination problem nested within a dilemma.

Coordination is an essential part of social functioning. The authors distinguish 2 types of coordination: matching and mismatching. In matching, coordination is successful if parties choose the same action. In mismatching, coordination is successful if people choose different actions. In 3 studies, the authors investigated the downstream social consequences of tacit coordination for interpersonal perceptions. In all studies, participants repeatedly choose between 2 bets with equivalent expected values, and payoffs increased either when they choose the same bet or when they choose different bets. In the 1st 2 studies, coordination success increased the perceptions of interpersonal similarity and liking when matching was required but not when mismatching was required. The authors' interpretation is that matching responses and coordination success had countervailing effects in the mismatching task. Also, percentage of matched responses did not affect perceptions when coordination was not required (Experiment 2). In 4 person teams, a frequently matching partner was viewed more favorably (smarter, more similar to self, and more liked) than were other teammates, even when mismatching increased payoffs (Experiment 3).

This study examined whether differences in the endorsement of the 'Protestant Work Ethic' (PWE) are related to motivation losses in group work. Three factors were derived from male student scores on the Mirels-Garrett Protestant Work Ethic Scale, Ho's Australian Work Ethic Scale and a scale designed to assess preferences for reward distributions: instrumental value of work, ethical value of work and normative value of equity. The study assessed motivation loss in two situations; one designed to promote free-rider effects and another designed to promote sucker effects. Results showed that the sucker effect was moderated by all three factors but in qualitatively different ways whereas the free rider effect was not strongly moderated by any of the PWE factors.

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