Social information processing in strategic decision-making: Why timing matters

Resisting the temptation to compete: Self-control promotes cooperation in mixed-motive interactions

“…On the basis of research by Morris et al (1998), we manipulate illusory control by varying whether participants in mixed-motive interaction act first versus simultaneously or second. When participants act first, they experience greater illusory control over their counterparts, even when the second player acts before viewing the first player's response and thus cannot be subject to any real influence (Morris et al, 1998; see also Abele et al, 2004). We predict that in mixed-motive settings, a sense (including an illusion) of interpersonal control is a prerequisite for people to exercise selfcontrol.…”

“…That is, individuals are only likely to increase cooperation to counteract anticipated barriers to success if they believe that their efforts to cooperate will be noticeable, efficacious, and induce reciprocity (Bandura, 1977;Kerr, 1983;1989), thereby securing their long-term interests. Such a sense of control, even when illusory, can be reassuring that expressing trust in a counterpart through cooperation will actually pay off (Abele, Bless, & Ehrhart, 2004;Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2009;Morris, Sim, & Girotto, 1998;Shafir & Tversky, 1992).…”

Modeling cold supply chain environment of organized farm products retailing in India

“…By this, the life of farm products is automatically increases. Abele et al (2004) also indicates that the infrastructure is an important factor that affects SCP.…”

The timing effect in public good games

“…In coordination games without a first-mover advantage you prefer the same thing than the other person, but in case of a mismatch, you would have a greater loss choosing the option that you both prefer, compared to choosing the option that is less attractive for both of you. For example, Abele, Bless, and Ehrhart (2004) had players play an extended version of the stag-hunt coordination game. Players could choose any number between 9 and 19.…”

“…Choosing the number 19 is the Maxmax strategy, as it provides the highest payoff in the best case. Abele et al (2004) showed that players moving in a pseudo-sequential order are more likely to choose risky strategies (Maxmax), whereas simultaneous movers are more likely to opt for risk-avoiding alternatives (Maxmin). These results showed that using knowledge about timing of unobserved moves is not only done, when it can function as a coordination device.…”