Group Judgments: Deliberation, Statistical Means, and Information Markets

Sunstein, Cass R.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.578301

Cited by 172 publications

(110 citation statements)

References 176 publications

(162 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

104

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Perhaps the death penalty is opposed (as it is sometimes endorsed) on expressivist grounds; perhaps the social meanings of capital punishment are what drive opponents as well as advocates. 72 But if the evidence outlined here is correct, expressivist opposition is not so easy to sustain. A failure to protect workers against severe occupational risks is objectionable on expressive grounds because it reflects contempt for the safety of workers.…”

Section: See Generally Rm Hare Moral Thinking: Its Levels Methodsmentioning

confidence: 87%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The Relevance of Life-Life Tradeoffs

Sunstein

Vermeule²

2005

SSRN Journal

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Recent evidence suggests that capital punishment may have a significant deterrent effect, preventing as many eighteen or more murders for each execution. This evidence greatly unsettles moral objections to the death penalty, because it suggests that a refusal to impose that penalty condemns numerous innocent people to death. Capital punishment thus presents a life-life tradeoff, and a serious commitment to the sanctity of human life may well compel, rather than forbid, that form of punishment. Moral objections to the death penalty frequently depend on a distinction between acts and omissions, but that distinction is misleading in this context, because government is a special kind of moral agent. The familiar problems with capital punishmentpotential error, irreversibility, arbitrariness, and racial skew-do not argue in favor of abolition, because the world of homicide suffers from those same problems in even more acute form. The widespread failure to appreciate the life-life tradeoffs involved in capital punishment may depend on cognitive processes that fail to treat "statistical lives" with the seriousness that they deserve.Many people believe capital punishment is morally impermissible. In their view, executions are inherently cruel and barbaric. 1 Often they add that capital punishment is not, and cannot be, imposed in a way that adheres to the rule of law. 2 They contend that as administered, capital punishment ensures the execution of (some) innocent people, and also that it reflects arbitrariness, in the form of random or invidious infliction of the ultimate penalty. 3

show abstract

Section: See Generally Rm Hare Moral Thinking: Its Levels Methodsmentioning

confidence: 87%

“…They will not be enthusiastic about the suggestion that their moral 72 judgments are instead a product of some kind of cognitive error. But in the regulatory domain as a whole, it has become standard to say that cognitive processes contribute to large mistakes, at least on questions of fact.…”

Section: Cognition and Capital Punishmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The Relevance of Life-Life Tradeoffs

Sunstein

Vermeule²

2005

SSRN Journal

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…71 See Wayne R. Lafave, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW §10.1(d) at 129-131(2003) (saying one must wait until there is absolutely no other option and "the hope of survival disappears"). 72 See LaFave, supra, §10.5 at 161. 73 Although the Israeli Supreme Court denied that the necessity defense authorizes coercive interrogation, it, at the same time, said that officials could use the necessity defense if they are charged.…”

Section: The Necessity Defensementioning

confidence: 99%

Should Coercive Interrogation Be Legal?

Posner

Vermeule²

2005

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…71 Although Sweden does not have a tradition of robust judicial review, its access provision is nevertheless meaningful. 72 …”

Section: Textual Provisionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For helpful context from the procourt perspective, see Deyling, supra note 128, at [70][71][72][73][74][75][76][77][78][79][80][81][82]. 131 See, e.g., Halpern v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279, 292 (2d Cir.…”

Section: Spheres Of Executive Discretionmentioning

confidence: 99%