Group size, group homo-geneity, and the aggregate provision of a pure public good under cournot behavior

McGuire, Martin C.

doi:10.1007/bf01718500

Cited by 178 publications

(72 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…The present paper argues that the comparison between voluntary donations in a small and a large community may be different for the case of altruistically motivated 1 Generalizing earlier results by McGuire (1974) and Chamberlin (1974), Andreoni (1988), and Fries et al (1991) have shown that the variables (i) and (ii) are negatively correlated with group size if private consumption and the public good are normal commodities. Gaube (2001) has pointed out that the additional assumption of gross substitutability between these commodities is sufficient for a negative effect of group size on the variable (iii).…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 54%

Altruism and Charitable Giving in a Fully Replicated Economy

Gaube

2005

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractIn this paper, an economy is analyzed where one group of agents, the altruists, cares about the well-being of another group of agents, the recipients. It is asked how changes in the size of these groups affect the altruists' charitable giving in the Nash equilibrium. I show that a pure group size effect, i.e., a proportional expansion of both subgroups can lead to less free riding and to a lower degree of underprovision relative to the efficient level of charitable giving.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 54%

Altruism and Charitable Giving in a Fully Replicated Economy

Gaube

2005

SSRN Journal

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“…Clan members may differ in their relative abilities for internal and external fights, but often these abilities should be expected to be positively correlated. 20 McGuire (1974) introduced this setup when studying collective action. The seminal paper using this technology is Bergstrom et al (1986).…”

Section: Proposition 2 If the Clan Generates A Given Amount Of Aggregmentioning

confidence: 99%

Self-enforcing norms and efficient non-cooperative collective action in the provision of public goods

Konrad

Leininger

2010

Public Choice

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We show how norms can solve the distributional conflict inside a group in an anarchic environment and yield efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external competitor. The equilibrium of the fully non-cooperative game with finite horizon has two interesting features. First, one of the players assumes a central role that resembles the role of the 'big-man' in some primitive stateless societies. Second, the group members' contributions to collective output and the payments from the big-man to these members seemingly look like reciprocal behavior, even though they are driven by narrowly selfish preferences.

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“…First, while individuals contribute less in large groups, this does not necessarily imply that there are less effective. Chamberlin (1974) and McGuire (1974) first pointed out that Olson's thesis of a negative relationship between effective collective action and group size holds when the prize is private but is overturned when the prize is public and not divisible among group members. Second, cooperation may be achieved in a repeated-game setup through the use of an appropriate trigger strategy (e.g., Axelrod 1981).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The collective action problem: Within-group cooperation and between-group competition in a repeated rent-seeking game

Cheikbossian¹

2012

Games and Economic Behavior

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for comments and suggestions. I also thank for useful discussions seminar participants at the Université de Montpellier, Université de Toulouse, Université de Montréal, UQAM (Montréal), Université Laval (Québec), Canadian Economic Association (Montréal) and ESEM 2006 (Vienna). Finally, I should also like to thank two anonymous referees and an anonymous associate editor for their comments and suggestions. This paper has been greatly improved by them.The usual disclaimer applies. 1Abstract: This paper analyzes the ability of group members to cooperate in rent-seeking activities in a context of between-group competition. For this purpose, we develop an infinitely repeated rent-seeking game between two groups of different size. We first investigate Nash reversion strategies to support cooperative behavior in a given group before analyzing double-edge trigger strategies which have the property that cheating on the cooperative agreement in a given group is followed by non-cooperation in this group and cooperation in the rival group. The main conclusion is that the set of parameters for which cooperation can be sustained within the larger group as a subgame perfect outcome is as large as that for which cooperation can be sustained in the smaller group. Hence, in contrast with Olson's (1965) celebrated thesis but in accordance with many informal and formal observations, the larger group is as effective as the smaller group in furthering its interest.

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Group size, group homo-geneity, and the aggregate provision of a pure public good under cournot behavior

Cited by 178 publications

References 2 publications

Altruism and Charitable Giving in a Fully Replicated Economy

Altruism and Charitable Giving in a Fully Replicated Economy

Self-enforcing norms and efficient non-cooperative collective action in the provision of public goods

The collective action problem: Within-group cooperation and between-group competition in a repeated rent-seeking game

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