2014
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-014-0350-8
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Groupthink

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Cited by 33 publications
(36 citation statements)
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“…Importantly, linear opinion pooling does not commute with conditionalization, though geometric pooling does (Genest, 1984;Russell et al, 2015). As we will see, linear pooling does commute with imaging, though geometric pooling does not.…”
Section: External Bayesianitymentioning
confidence: 76%
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“…Importantly, linear opinion pooling does not commute with conditionalization, though geometric pooling does (Genest, 1984;Russell et al, 2015). As we will see, linear pooling does commute with imaging, though geometric pooling does not.…”
Section: External Bayesianitymentioning
confidence: 76%
“…As standardly pointed out, external Bayesianity is a generalization of the requirement that pooling and standard conditionalization commute (Wagner, 2009;Dietrich and List, 2014;Russell et al, 2015), because conditionalization on a common likelihood function generalizes standard Bayesian conditionalization on an event. A likelihood function, λ : Ω Ñ r0, 8q, is intended to encode, given any ω P Ω, how expected some evidence is with the number λpωq.…”
Section: External Bayesianitymentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…I will not attempt a survey of impossibility theorems in the theory of probability aggregation (see Genest and Zidek 1986;Russell et al 2015;Dietrich and List 2016). Instead, I will simply look at the most obvious and popular probability aggregation rule, note one condition it violates, and then turn to a reasons-based approach to group credences.…”
Section: Group Credences and Probability Aggregationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…If there are finitely many worlds in our probability space, then Neutrality can be achieved by having the prior be uniform, assigning each of the n worlds probability 1/n. But if there are infinitely many worlds, this is impossible (assuming countable additivity): 'there is no probability function on an infinite σ-algebra which is symmetric under arbitrary measurable permutations' (Russell et al 2015(Russell et al , 1300. But in my view, Neutrality is undermotivated.…”
Section: Continuitymentioning
confidence: 99%