Guided test generation for isolation and detection of embedded trojans in ics

Banga, Mainak; Chandrasekar, Maheshwar; Fang, Lei; Hsiao, Michael S.

doi:10.1145/1366110.1366196

Cited by 67 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Prior Work: Detection of backdoors inserted by malicious foundries [12,16,17,24,40,53,69] TrustNET and DataWatch detects backdoors inserted by malicious chip designers (no prior solution)…”

Section: Tapeout and Fabrication Deploymentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In Section IV we describe our solution. Section V presents Incidents: [10] Attacks: [35] Solutions: This work Solutions: [12,16,17,24,40,53,69] No known attack/solutions Solutions: Trusted Processor Modules Device authentication mechanisms.…”

Section: Tapeout and Fabrication Deploymentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Broadly speaking, work in this area can fall into one of three categories: threats and countermeasures against malicious designers, threats and countermeasures against malicious design automation tools, and threats and countermeasures against malicious foundries. There has been some work on detecting backdoors inserted by malicious foundries that typically rely on side-channel information such as power for detection [12,16,17,24,41,54,57,70]. There has been no work on providing countermeasures against malicious designers, which this work aims to address.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Tamper Evident Microprocessors

Waksman

Sethumadhavan

2010

2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy

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Abstract-Most security mechanisms proposed to date unquestioningly place trust in microprocessor hardware. This trust, however, is misplaced and dangerous because microprocessors are vulnerable to insider attacks that can catastrophically compromise security, integrity and privacy of computer systems. In this paper, we describe several methods to strengthen the fundamental assumption about trust in microprocessors. By employing practical, lightweight attack detectors within a microprocessor, we show that it is possible to protect against malicious logic embedded in microprocessor hardware.We propose and evaluate two area-efficient hardware methods -TRUSTNET and DATAWATCH -that detect attacks on microprocessor hardware by knowledgeable, malicious insiders. Our mechanisms leverage the fact that multiple components within a microprocessor (e.g., fetch, decode pipeline stage etc.) must necessarily coordinate and communicate to execute even simple instructions, and that any attack on a microprocessor must cause erroneous communications between microarchitectural subcomponents used to build a processor. A key aspect of our solution is that TRUSTNET and DATAWATCH are themselves highly resilient to corruption. We demonstrate that under realistic assumptions, our solutions can protect pipelines and on-chip cache hierarchies at negligible area cost and with no performance impact. Combining TRUSTNET and DATAWATCH with prior work on fault detection has the potential to provide complete coverage against a large class of microprocessor attacks. 1Index Terms-hardware security, backdoors, microprocessors, security based on causal structure and division of work.

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“…Prior Work: Detection of backdoors inserted by malicious foundries [12,16,17,24,40,53,69] TrustNET and DataWatch detects backdoors inserted by malicious chip designers (no prior solution)…”

Section: Tapeout and Fabrication Deploymentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Tapeout and Fabrication Deploymentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Tamper Evident Microprocessors

Waksman

Sethumadhavan

2010

2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy

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“…Banga et al [4,3] propose a region-based testing that first identifies the problematic regions based on power signatures and then performs more tests on the region. The underlying mathematical and logical circuit structure or the process variations are not considered.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Unified Submodular Framework for Multimodal IC Trojan Detection

2010

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Abstract. This paper presents a unified formal framework for integrated circuits (IC) Trojan detection that can simultaneously employ multiple noninvasive measurement types. Hardware Trojans refer to modifications, alterations, or insertions to the original IC for adversarial purposes. The new framework formally defines the IC Trojan detection for each measurement type as an optimization problem and discusses the complexity. A formulation of the problem that is applicable to a large class of Trojan detection problems and is submodular is devised. Based on the objective function properties, an efficient Trojan detection method with strong approximation and optimality guarantees is introduced. Signal processing methods for calibrating the impact of inter-chip and intra-chip correlations are presented. We propose a number of methods for combining the detections of the different measurement types. Experimental evaluations on benchmark designs reveal the low-overhead and effectiveness of the new Trojan detection framework and provides a comparison of different detection combining methods.

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“…Comprehensive reviews can be found in [2] and [3]. Several authors used the power supply transient current signal for Trojan detection [4]- [7]. Using the timing signal signature by testing multiple path signatures was suggested [8].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%