Gunk, Topology and Measure

Arntzenius, Frank

doi:10.1007/978-94-007-0214-1_16

Cited by 23 publications

(29 citation statements)

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“…But all of the arguments I know of for the existence of gunk just assume that the world has proper parts. For instance, the arguments in Arntzenius (2008) are best read as arguments not for the existence of gunk, but against the existence of extensionless point parts; he just assumes that the world has proper parts, and he doesn't really address the question of whether it has "chunky" parts (i.e., extended-simple parts). And to give a second example, the pro-gunk argument that Sider discusses in his (2013)-the argument based on the claim that physicists keep finding smaller and smaller particles-is really an argument against the existence of chunky parts.…”

Section: The Argument For (A)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why the debate about composition is factually empty (or why there’s no fact of the matter whether anything exists)

Balaguer

2017

Synthese

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I argue in this paper that the debate over composition is factually empty; in other words, I argue that there's no fact of the matter whether there are any composite objects like tables and rocks and cats. Moreover, at the end of the paper, I explain how my argument is suggestive of a much more general (and much more radical) conclusion, namely, that there's no fact of the matter whether there are any material objects at all. Roughly speaking, the paper proceeds by arguing that (a) if there were a fact of the matter about whether composite objects exist, then it would be either a necessary fact or a contingent fact, and (b) both of these alternatives are implausible.

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Section: The Argument For (A)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why the debate about composition is factually empty (or why there’s no fact of the matter whether anything exists)

Balaguer

2017

Synthese

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“…It's worth emphasizing that rejecting the continuity of spacetime isn't an ad hoc move. First, many philosophers have advocated this position in light of various puzzles that arise for the orthodox continuum view (see, e.g., Arntzenius (2003;2008;2012, ch.4), Forrest (2004), Russell (2008), and Segal (2017)). Some also take the position to garner support from some of the main current options for a theory of quantum gravity (see Rovelli (2001) for relevant discussion), though whether anything even analogously spatiotemporal will remain at the fundamental level in such a theory still remains to be seen (see Huggett and Wüthrich (2013)).…”

Section: Two More Radical Optionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A puzzle about rates of change

Builes

Teitel

2019

Philos Stud

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Most of our best scientific descriptions of the world employ rates of change of some continuous quantity with respect to some other continuous quantity. For instance, in classical physics we arrive at a particle's velocity by taking the time-derivative of its position, and we arrive at a particle's acceleration by taking the time-derivative of its velocity. Because rates of change are defined in terms of other continuous quantities, most think that facts about some rate of change obtain in virtue of facts about those other continuous quantities. For example, on this view facts about a particle's velocity at a time obtain in virtue of facts about how that particle's position is changing at that time. In this paper we raise a puzzle for this orthodox reductionist account of rate of change quantities and evaluate some possible replies. We don't decisively come down in favour of one reply over the others, though we say some things to support taking our puzzle to cast doubt on the standard view that spacetime is continuous.

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“…In the same vein, Ted Sider writes that an object is gunky just in case “each of its parts (including itself) has proper parts” (Sider, , p. 270, my italics). Other works containing similar remarks include Arntzenius (), Hazen (), Hudson (), Nolan (), Schaffer (), and Varzi (). Some authors use “stuff” or “matter” instead of “object,” or “making up” instead of “composing,” but the intent is clear.…”

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confidence: 93%

What it takes to be hunky

Giberman

2020

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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A world is gunky iff every object that exists according to it has others as proper parts. A world is junky iff every object that exists according to it is a proper part of some others. Several philosophers have followed (Bohn, 2009a) in then saying that a world is “hunky” just in case it is both gunky and junky. The present note explains a need to clarify the determinative criteria for being hunky. It then provides the needed clarification and explains why the issue, though subtle, is not merely pedantic.

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Gunk, Topology and Measure

Cited by 23 publications

References 10 publications

Why the debate about composition is factually empty (or why there’s no fact of the matter whether anything exists)

Why the debate about composition is factually empty (or why there’s no fact of the matter whether anything exists)

A puzzle about rates of change

What it takes to be hunky

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