Hadza Cooperation

Abstract

Strong reciprocity is an effective way to promote cooperation. This is especially true when one not only cooperates with cooperators and defects on defectors (second-party punishment) but even punishes those who defect on others (third-party, "altruistic" punishment). Some suggest we humans have a taste for such altruistic punishment and that this was important in the evolution of human cooperation. To assess this we need to look across a wide range of cultures. As part of a cross-cultural project, I played three experimental economics games with the Hadza, who are hunter-gatherers in Tanzania. The Hadza frequently engaged in second-party punishment but they rarely engaged in third-party punishment. Other small-scale societies engaged in less third-party punishment as well. I suggest thirdparty punishment only became more important in large, complex societies to solve more pressing collective-action problems.

On the psychology of cooperation in humans and other primates: combining the natural history and experimental evidence of prosociality

“…There are two explanations for this. Firstly, the potentially high costs imposed on cheaters in a society of interdependent individuals (Boehm 1999;Gurven 2004;Kaplan et al 2009;Marlowe 2009), which we have internalized as 'conscience', functioning to anticipate others' reactions (Trivers 1971;DeScioli & Kurzban 2009), have lead to an increase in prosocial behaviour in the presence of subtle cues of being watched. Secondly, individuals (mainly men) may send costly signals in the presence of large audiences, thus advertising themselves as valuable cooperation partners or mates (Smith & Bliege Bird 2005).…”

Punishment: one tool, many uses

“…Before discussing the empirical literature, it is worth bearing in mind that many of the studies we cite were conducted in the laboratory using WEIRD participants (but see for notable exceptions Ensminger and Henrich 2014;Gächter and Herrmann 2011;Henrich 2000;Henrich et al 2010cHenrich et al , 2005Henrich et al , 2006Herrmann et al 2008;Marlowe 2009;Marlowe et al 2008;Marlowe, et al 2011;Wiessner 2009). In contrast to the laboratory studies, data from the real world suggest that people are often unwilling to punish when opportunities to do so arise (Balafoutas et al 2014a;Baumard 2010;Guala 2012;Pedersen et al 2018; but see Mathew and Boyd 2011).…”

When and Why Do Third Parties Punish Outside of the Lab? A Cross-Cultural Recall Study

“…In laboratory experimental games, the majority of third parties are willing to pay costs to punish a transgressor who has harmed a stranger, a finding that has been replicated across several cultures (Bernhard, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2006; Henrich et al, 2005, 2006; cf. Marlowe, 2009). For instance, in an anonymous, one-shot experimental economic game called the third-party punishment game, Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) found that approximately two thirds of third parties punished transgressors who unfairly split a sum of money.…”