Punishment: one tool, many uses

Raihani, Nichola; Bshary, Redouan

doi:10.1017/ehs.2019.12

Cited by 101 publications

(144 citation statements)

References 272 publications

(641 reference statements)

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“…Further investigation for the topic is required. While punishment may need to be perceived as legitimate for the punisher to receive positive evaluation (Raihani & Bshary, 2019), further research is required to investigate why the punishment of non-cooperators by a third-party observer is not considered as legitimate in the public goods game. Since punitive strategies evolve only when the cost of punishment is compensated by some form of benefit, it should be investigated whether punishers gain rewards other than evaluations and whether they are more likely to be chosen as game partners.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It has been noted that the reason punishers in the PGP game are negatively evaluated is that they are perceived as retaliatory or aggressive figures, while this is not the case in the TPP game where they are positively evaluated (Raihani & Bshary, 2015a, 2019. Cooperators in the PGP receive less payment when there is a non-cooperator in the group compared to when everyone cooperates.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Evaluation of Second- and Third-Party Punishers

Mifune

Okuda³

2020

Lett Evol Behav Sci

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Although punishment can promote cooperative behavior, the evolution of punishment requires benefi ts which override the cost. One possible source of the benefi t of punishing uncooperative behavior is obtaining a positive evaluation. This study compares evaluations of punishers and non-punishers. Two hundred and thirty-four undergraduate students participated in two studies. Study 1 revealed that, in the public goods game, punishers were not positively evaluated, while punishers were positively evaluated in the third-party punishment game. In Study 2, where the non-cooperator was a participant of a public goods game, we manipulated the punishers participation in the game. The results showed that punishers received no positive evaluations, regardless of their participation in the game, indicating that negative evaluation may not be a reaction toward aggression with retaliatory intentions.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Evaluation of Second- and Third-Party Punishers

Mifune

Okuda³

2020

Lett Evol Behav Sci

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“…They can avoid imposing direct costs, and we know from other recent research that people often seek to enhance the communicative value and reduce the costs imposed by their punitive acts (Molnar, Chaudry, & Lowenstein, 2020). Why, then, do people also sometimes make punishments very harmful to the target (Rai, Valdesolo & Graham, 2017) (Raihani & Bshary, 2019).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…At an ultimate level, one of punishment's functions is to modify the behavior of social partners (Boon, Deveau, & Alibhai, 2009;Cushman, 2015;Hampton, 1984;Heider, 1958;Martin & Cushman, 2016;Miller, 2001;Morris, 1981;Smith 1759Smith /1869, but see Raihani & Bshary, 2019 for alternative functions). It typically occurs when somebody has caused harm or violated a norm, and it typically serves to both modify that person's future behavior and also indirectly influence others who observe it.…”

Section: The Psychology Of Punishmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Punishment is Organized around Principles of Communicative Inference

Sarin¹,

Ho²,

Martin³

et al. 2020

Preprint

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Humans use punishment to influence each other’s behavior. Many current theories presume that this operates as a simple form of incentive. In contrast, we show that people infer the communicative intent behind punishment, which can sometimes diverge sharply from its immediate incentive value. In other words, people respond to punishment not as a reward to be maximized, but as a communicative signal to be interpreted. Specifically, we show that people expect harmless, yet communicative, punishments to be as effective as harmful punishments (Study 1). Under some situation, people display a systematic preference for harmless punishments over more canonical, harmful punishments (Study 2). People readily seek out and infer the communicative message inherent in a punishment (Study 3). And, people expect that learning from punishment depends on the ease with which its communicative intent can be inferred (Study 4). Taken together, these findings demonstrate that people expect punishment to be constructed and interpreted as a communicative act.

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“…Punishment is thought to be important in maintaining human cooperation over time in realistic scenarios (Boyd and Richerson, 1992;Fehr and Gächter, 2002). Hungry people could use punishment differently, either doing so less, doing so in a less prosocially-directed way, or being more prone to rounds of retaliation and counter-retaliation (for a review of the variety of ways that punishment is used in cooperation tasks, see Raihani and Bshary (2019)).…”

Section: General Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hunger affects social decisions in a multi-round Public Goods Game but not a single-shot Ultimatum Game

Fraser¹,

Nettle²

2019

Preprint

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Objective. People have the intuition that hunger undermines social cooperation, but experimental tests of this have often produced null results. One possible explanation is that the experimental tasks used are not rich enough to capture the diverse pathways by which social cooperation can be sustained or break down in real life. We studied the effects of hunger on cooperation in two tasks of differential interaction richness. Methods. We manipulated hunger by asking participants to eat, or refrain from eating, breakfast. Participants in experiment 1 (n = 106) played a one-shot Ultimatum Game. Participants in experiment 2 (n = 264) played twenty rounds of a Public Goods Game in the same groups of four, ten rounds with the possibility of punishing other group members, and ten without. Results. In experiment 1, skipping breakfast had no significant effects on either amounts proposed or minimum acceptable offers. In experiment 2, there were multiple different significant effects of the manipulation. No-breakfast participants were more generous in the first round of the game without punishment, and in subsequent rounds, were more influenced by what other group members had done the round before. In the punishment game, no-breakfast participants were also less likely to punish their group-mates than breakfast participants. Consequently, the possibility of punishment was less effective in increasing group cooperation levels in no-breakfast groups. Conclusion. Replicating earlier findings, we found a null effect of hunger on cooperation in a one-shot Ultimatum Game. However, in our richer Public Goods Game, the dynamics of cooperation differed with hunger, in subtle ways not simply classifiable as hungry participants being ‘more’ or ‘less’ cooperative overall.

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Punishment: one tool, many uses

Abstract: Abstract

Cited by 101 publications

References 272 publications

The Evaluation of Second- and Third-Party Punishers

The Evaluation of Second- and Third-Party Punishers

Punishment is Organized around Principles of Communicative Inference

Hunger affects social decisions in a multi-round Public Goods Game but not a single-shot Ultimatum Game

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